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Robust Monetary Policy Rules with
Unknown Natural Rates 
The natural rate is an abstraction; like faith, it is seen by its works. One can only
say that if the bank policy succeeds in stabilizing prices, the bank rate must
have been brought in line with the natural rate, but if it does not, it must not
have been.1
THE CONVENTIONAL PARADIGM for the conduct of monetary policy calls
for the monetary authority to attain its objectives of a low and stable rate
of inﬂation and full employment by adjusting its short-term interest rate
instrument—in the United States, the federal funds rate—in response to
economic developments. In principle, when aggregate demand and
employment fall short of the economy’s natural levels of output and
employment, or when other deﬂationary concerns appear on the horizon,
the central bank should ease monetary policy by bringing real interest
rates below the economy’s natural rate of interest for some time. Con-
versely, the central bank should respond to inﬂationary concerns by
adjusting interest rates upward so as to bring real interest rates above the
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1017-02 BPEA/Orphanides  12/30/02  14:54  Page 63natural rate. In this setting, the natural rate of unemployment is the unem-
ployment rate consistent with stable inﬂation; the natural rate of interest is
the real interest rate consistent with unemployment being at its natural
rate, and therefore with stable inﬂation.2 In carrying out this strategy in
practice, the policymaker would ideally have accurate, quantitative, con-
temporaneous readings of the natural rate of interest and the natural rate
of unemployment. Under those circumstances, economic stabilization
policy would be relatively straightforward.
However, an important difﬁculty that complicates policymaking in
practice and may limit the scope for stabilization policy is that policy-
makers do not know the values of these natural rates in real time, that is,
when they make policy decisions. Indeed, even in hindsight there is con-
siderable uncertainty regarding the natural rates of unemployment and
interest, and ambiguity about how best to model and estimate natural
rates. Milton Friedman, arguing against natural rate–based policies in his
presidential address to the American Economic Association, posited that
“One problem is that [the policymaker] cannot know what the ‘natural’
rate is. Unfortunately, we have as yet devised no method to estimate accu-
rately and readily the natural rate of either interest or unemployment. And
the ‘natural’ rate will itself change from time to time.”3 Friedman’s com-
ments echo those made decades earlier by John H. Williams and by Gus-
tav Cassel, who wrote of the natural rate of interest: “The bank cannot
know at a certain moment what is the equilibrium rate of interest of the
capital market.”4 Even earlier, Knut Wicksell stressed that “the natural
rate is not ﬁxed or unalterable in magnitude.”5 Recent research using
modern statistical techniques to estimate the natural rates of unemploy-
ment, output, and interest indicates that this problem is no less relevant
today than it was 35, 75, or 105 years ago.
These measurement problems appear particularly acute in the presence
of structural change, when natural rates may vary unpredictably, subject-
ing estimates to increased uncertainty. Douglas Staiger, James Stock, and
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2. This deﬁnition leaves open the question of the length of the horizon over which one
deﬁnes inﬂation stability. Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), Woodford (forthcoming), and
Neiss and Nelson (2001), among others, consider deﬁnitions of the natural rates in which
inﬂation is constant in every period, whereas many other authors (cited later in this paper)
examine estimates of a lower frequency, or “trend” natural rates.
3. Friedman (1968, p. 10).
4. Cassel (1928, p. 518).
5. Wicksell (1898/1936, p. 106).
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unemployment are very imprecise.6 Orphanides and Simon van Norden
show that estimates of the related concept of the natural rate of output
(that is, potential output) are likewise plagued by imprecision.7 Similarly,
Thomas Laubach and John C. Williams document the great degree of
uncertainty regarding estimates of the natural rate of interest.8 These difﬁ-
culties have led some observers to discount the usefulness of natural rate
estimates for policymaking. William Brainard and George Perry conclude
“that conventional estimates from a NAIRU [nonaccelerating-inﬂation
rate of unemployment] model do not identify the full employment range
with a degree of accuracy that is useful to policymaking.”9 Staiger, Stock,
and Watson suggest a reorientation of monetary policy away from
reliance on the natural rate of unemployment, noting that
a rule in which monetary policy responds not to the level of the unemployment
rate but to recent changes in unemployment without reference to the NAIRU
(and perhaps to a measure of the deviation of inﬂation from a target rate of
inﬂation) is immune to the imprecision of measurement that is highlighted in
this paper. An interesting question is the construction of formal policy rules that
account for the imprecision of estimation of the NAIRU.10
This question, coupled with the related issue of mismeasurement of the
natural rate of interest, is the focus of this paper. 
We employ a forward-looking quarterly model of the U.S. economy to
examine the performance and robustness properties of simple interest
rate policy rules in the presence of real-time mismeasurement of the
natural rates of interest and unemployment. Our work builds on an active
literature that has explored the implications of mismeasurement for mon-
etary policy.11 A key aspect of our investigation is the recognition that
policymakers may be uncertain as to the true data-generating processes
describing the natural rates of unemployment and interest and the extent
of the mismeasurement problem that they face. As a result, standard
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6. Staiger, Stock, and Watson (1997a); see also Staiger, Stock, and Watson (1997b)
and Laubach (2001).
7. Orphanides and van Norden (2002); see also Lansing (2002).
8. Laubach and Williams (forthcoming).
9. Brainard and Perry (2000, p. 69).
10. Staiger, Stock, and Watson (1997a, p. 239).
11. This literature includes Orphanides (1998, 2001, 2002a), Smets (2002), Wieland
(1998), Orphanides and others (2000), McCallum (2001), Rudebusch (2001, 2002),
Ehrmann and Smets (2002), and Nelson and Nikolov (2002).
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Gaussian control problem do not apply.12 To get a handle on this diffi-
culty, we compare the properties of policies optimized to provide good
stabilization performance across a large range of alternative estimates of
natural rate mismeasurement. We then examine the costs of basing pol-
icy decisions on rules that are optimized with incorrect baseline esti-
mates of mismeasurement, that is, rules that attempt to properly account
for the presence of uncertainty regarding the natural rates but inad-
vertently overestimate or underestimate the magnitude of the problem.
These robustness exercises point to a potentially important asymmetry
with regard to possible errors in the design of policy rules attempting to
account for natural rate uncertainty. We ﬁnd that the costs of underesti-
mating the extent of natural rate mismeasurement signiﬁcantly exceed the
costs of overestimating it. Adoption of policy rules optimized under the
false presumption that misperceptions regarding the natural rates are
likely to be small proves particularly costly in terms of stabilizing inﬂa-
tion and unemployment. By comparison, the inefﬁciency associated with
policies incorrectly based on the presumption that misperceptions
regarding the natural rates are likely to be large tends to be relatively
modest. As a result, when policymakers do not possess a precise estimate
of the magnitude of misperceptions regarding the natural rates, a robust
strategy is to act as if the uncertainty they face is greater than their base-
line estimates suggest. We show that overlooking these considerations
can easily result in policies with considerably worse stabilization perfor-
mance than anticipated.
Our results point toward an effective, simple strategy that is a robust
solution to the difﬁculties associated with natural rate misperceptions.
This strategy is to adopt, as guidelines for monetary policy, difference
rules in which the short-term nominal interest rate is raised or lowered in
response to inﬂation and changes in economic activity. These rules, which
do not require knowledge of the natural rates of interest and unemploy-
ment and are consequently immune to likely misperceptions in these con-
cepts, emerge as the solution to a robust control exercise from a wider
66 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2002
12. See Swanson (2000) and Svensson and Woodford (forthcoming) for recent expo-
sitions of certainty equivalence in the absence of any model uncertainty. Hansen and Sar-
gent (2002) offer a modern treatment of robust control in the presence of possible model
misspecification.
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mal” in the sense of delivering ﬁrst-best stabilization performance under
the assumption that policymakers have precise knowledge of the form and
magnitude of the uncertainty they face, they are robust in that they effec-
tively ensure against major mistakes when such knowledge is not held
with great conﬁdence.
Finally, our results suggest that some important historical differences
in monetary policy and macroeconomic outcomes over the past forty or so
years can be traced to differences in the formulation of monetary policy
that closely relate to the treatment of the natural rates. As we illustrate,
misperceptions regarding the natural rates, importantly due to a steady
increase in the natural rate of unemployment, could have contributed to
the stagﬂationary outcomes of the 1970s. Paradoxically, a policy that
would be optimal at stabilizing inﬂation and unemployment if the natural
rates of unemployment and interest were known can yield dismal out-
comes when the natural rates are rising and policymakers do not know it.
In contrast, our analysis suggests that had policy followed a robust rule
that ignores information about the levels of natural rates during the 1970s,
outcomes could have been considerably better. Conversely, outcomes
during the disinﬂationary boom of the 1990s appear consistent with the
monetary authorities following a policy closer to our robust policy rules.
The natural rate of unemployment apparently drifted downward signiﬁ-
cantly during the decade, which might have resulted in deﬂation had
policymakers pursued the policy that real-time assessments of the natural
rates would have dictated. In the event, policymakers during the mid- and
late 1990s avoided this pitfall.
Policy in the Presence of Uncertain Natural Rates
As a starting point, we look at the nature of the problem in the context
of a generalization of the simple policy rule proposed by John Taylor ten
years ago.13 Let ft be the nominal interest (federal funds) rate, πt the rate of
inﬂation, and ut the rate of unemployment, all measured in quarter t. The
Taylor rule can then be expressed by
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policymaker’s estimates of the natural rates of interest and unemploy-
ment, respectively. Note that here we consider a variant of the Taylor rule
that responds to the unemployment gap (the difference between the actual
unemployment rate and its natural rate) instead of the output gap, recog-
nizing that the two are related by Okun’s Law.14 As is well known, rules
of this type have been found to perform quite well in terms of stabilizing
economic ﬂuctuations in model-based evaluations, at least when the nat-
ural rates of interest and unemployment are accurately measured. In his
1993 exposition, Taylor examined response parameters equal to 
1⁄2 for the
inﬂation gap and the output gap, which, using an Okun’s coefﬁcient of 2,
corresponds to setting θπ = 0.5 and θu = –1.0. We also consider a revised
version of this rule with double the responsiveness of policy to the output
gap (θu = –2.0 in our case), which Taylor found to yield improved stabi-
lization performance relative to his original rule.15
The promising properties of rules of this type were ﬁrst reported in the
Brookings volume edited by Ralph Bryant, Peter Hooper, and Catherine
Mann,16 which offered detailed comparisons of the stabilization perfor-
mance of various interest rate–based policy rules in several macroecono-
metric models.17 However, historical experience suggests that policy
guidance from this family of rules may be rather sensitive to mispercep-
tions regarding the natural rates of interest and unemployment. The expe-
rience of the 1970s offers a particularly stark illustration of the policy
errors that may result.18
We explore two dimensions along which the Taylor rule has been gen-
eralized, which in combination offer the potential to mitigate the problem
of natural rate mismeasurement. The ﬁrst aims to mitigate the effects of
mismeasuring the natural rate of unemployment by partly (or even fully)
ˆ* ut ˆ* r t
() ˆ () ( – ˆ ),
** * 1 fr uu tt t t u tt =++ − + πθ ππ θ π
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14. In what follows, we assume that an Okun’s law coefﬁcient of 2 is appropriate for
mapping the output gap onto the unemployment gap. This is signiﬁcantly lower than
Okun’s original suggestion of about 3.3. Recent views, as reﬂected in the work by various
authors, place this coefﬁcient in the 2 to 3 range.
15. Taylor (1999b).
16. Bryant, Hooper, and Mann (1993).
17. The contributions in Taylor (1999a), as reviewed in Taylor (1999b), provided addi-
tional support for this ﬁnding.
18. This experience is discussed in Orphanides (2000a, 2000b, 2002a).
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change in the unemployment rate.19 Although in general it is not a perfect
substitute for responding to the unemployment gap directly, responding to
the change in the unemployment rate is likely to be reasonably effective
because it calls for easing monetary policy when unemployment is rising
and tightening it when unemployment is falling.20 The second dimension
we explore is incorporation of policy inertia, represented by the presence
of the lagged short-term interest rate in the policy rule. As various authors
have shown,21 rules that exhibit a substantial degree of inertia can signiﬁ-
cantly improve the stabilization performance of the Taylor rule in for-
ward-looking models. The presence of inertia in the policy rule also
reduces the inﬂuence of the estimate of the natural rate of interest on the
current setting of monetary policy and, therefore, the extent to which mis-
perceptions regarding the natural rate of interest affect policy decisions.
To see this, consider a generalized Taylor rule of the form
The degree of policy inertia is measured by θf ≥ 0; cases where 0 <θ f < 1
are frequently referred to as “partial adjustment”; the case of θf = 1 is
termed a “difference rule” or “derivative control,”22 whereas θf > 1 repre-
sents superinertial behavior.23 These rules nest the Taylor rule as the spe-
cial case when θf =θ ∆u = 0.24
To illustrate more precisely the difﬁculty associated with the presence
of misperceptions regarding the natural rates of unemployment and inter-
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19. This modiﬁcation parallels that made by McCallum (2001), Orphanides (2000b),
Orphanides and others (2000), Leitemo and Lonning (2002), and others, who have argued
in favor of policy rules that respond to the growth rate of output rather than the output gap
when real-time estimates of the natural rate of output are prone to measurement error.
20. Interestingly, as Woodford (1999) has shown, the optimal policy from a “timeless
perspective” in the purely forward-looking “new synthesis” model responds to the change
in the output gap, but not to its level.
21. Including Williams (1999), Levin, Wieland, and Williams (1999, forthcoming),
and Rotemberg and Woodford (1999).
22. Phillips (1954).
23. Rotemberg and Woodford (1999).
24. Policy rules similar to equation 2 have been found in earlier studies to offer a sim-
ple characterization of historical monetary policy in the United States over the past few
decades (Orphanides, 2002b; Orphanides and Wieland, 1998; McCallum and Nelson,
1999; Levin, Wieland, and Williams, 1999, forthcoming).
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and  , available to policymakers when policy decisions are made,
from their “true” values u* and r*. If policy follows the generalized rule
given by equation 2, then the “policy error” introduced in period t by mis-
perceptions in period t is given by
Although unintentional, these errors could subsequently induce undesir-
able ﬂuctuations in the economy, worsening stabilization performance.
The extent to which misperceptions regarding the natural rates translate
into policy-induced ﬂuctuations depends on the parameters of the policy
rule. As is evident from the expression above, policies that are relatively
unresponsive to real-time assessments of the unemployment gap, that is,
those with small θu, minimize the impact of misperceptions regarding the
natural rate of unemployment. Similarly, inertial policies with θf near
unity reduce the direct effect of misperceptions regarding the natural rate
of interest. That said, inertial policies also carry forward the effects of
past misperceptions of the natural rates of interest and unemployment on
policy, and one must take account of this interaction in designing policies
that will be robust to natural rate mismeasurement.
One policy rule that is immune to natural rate mismeasurement of the
kind considered here is a “difference” rule, in which θf = 1 and θu = 0:25
We note that this policy rule is as simple, in terms of the number of param-
eters, as the original formulation of the Taylor rule. In addition, this rule is
certainly simpler to implement than the Taylor rule, because it does not
require knowledge of either the natural rate of interest or the natural rate
of unemployment. However, because this type of rule ignores potentially
useful information about the level of the unemployment rate and the nat-
ural rates of interest and unemployment, its performance relative to the
Taylor rule and the generalized rule will depend on the degree of mismea-
surement and the structure of the model of the economy, as we explore
() ( – ) ( – ) . –
*
– 3 11 ff u u tt t u tt =+ + θπ π θ π ∆
(– ) ( ˆ –) ( ˆ –) .
** ** 1 θθ ft u t t rr uu +
ˆ* r t ˆ* ut
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25. This speciﬁcation is similar to those examined by Judd and Motley (1992) and
Fuhrer and Moore (1995b), in which the change in the short-term rate responds to growth
in nominal income or to inﬂation, respectively.
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and nominal income targeting rules, stated in ﬁrst-difference form.
Historical Estimates of Natural Rates
Considerable evidence suggests that the natural rates of unemployment
and interest vary signiﬁcantly over time. In the case of the unemployment
rate, a number of factors have been put forward as underlying this varia-
tion, including changing demographics, changes in the efﬁciency of job
matching, changes in productivity, effects of greater openness to trade,
and changing rates of disability and incarceration.26 However, a great deal
of uncertainty surrounds the magnitude and timing of these effects on the
natural rate of unemployment. Similarly, the natural rate of interest is
likely to be inﬂuenced by variables that appear to change over time,
including the rate of trend income growth, ﬁscal policy, and household
preferences.27 But the factors determining the natural rate of interest are
not directly observed, and the quantitative relationship between them and
the natural rate remains poorly understood.
Even with the beneﬁt of hindsight and “best practice” techniques, our
knowledge about the natural rates remains cloudy, and this situation is
unlikely to improve in the foreseeable future. Staiger, Stock, and Watson
highlight three types of uncertainty regarding natural rate estimates.28 For
estimated models with deterministic natural rates, sampling uncertainty
related to the imprecision of estimates of model parameters is one source
of uncertainty. Sampling uncertainty alone yields 95 percent conﬁdence
intervals of between 2 and 4 percentage points for the natural rate of
unemployment,29 and between 3 and 4 percentage points for the natural
rate of interest.30 Allowing the natural rate to change unpredictably over
time adds another source of uncertainty; for example, the 95 percent con-
ﬁdence interval for a stochastically time-varying natural rate of interest is
over 7 percentage points, twice that associated with a constant natural
rate. Finally, there is considerable uncertainty and disagreement about
Athanasios Orphanides and John C. Williams 71
26. Shimer (1998); Katz and Krueger (1999); Ball and Mankiw (2002).
27. These are discussed in Laubach and Williams (forthcoming).
28. Staiger, Stock, and Watson (1997a).
29. Staiger, Stock, and Watson (1997a).
30. Laubach and Williams (forthcoming); Rudebusch (2001).
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and this model uncertainty implies that the confidence intervals based on
any particular model may understate the true degree of uncertainty that
policymakers face. Importantly for the analysis in this paper, policy-
makers cannot be confident that their natural rate estimates are efficient
or consistent, but realistically must make do with imperfect modeling
and estimating methods. 
Of course, in practice, policymakers are at an even greater disadvan-
tage than the econometrician who attempts to estimate natural rates retro-
spectively, because policymakers must act on “one-sided,” or real-time
natural rate estimates, which are based only on the data available at the
time the decision is made. As documented below, such estimates typically
are much noisier than the smooth retrospective, or “two-sided,” estimates
generally reported in the literature. For a given model, the difference
between the one-sided and the two-sided estimates provides an estimate
of natural rate misperceptions resulting from the real-time nature of the
policymaker’s problem.
To illustrate the extent of these measurement difficulties, we provide
comparisons of retrospective and real-time estimates of the natural rates
of unemployment and interest. The various measures correspond to alter-
native implementations of two basic statistical methodologies that have
been employed in the literature: univariate filters and multivariate
unobserved-components models. The univariate filters separate the
cyclical component of a series from its secular trend and use the latter as
a proxy for the natural level of the detrended series. Univariate filters
possess the advantages that they impose very little structure on the prob-
lem and are relatively simple to implement. Because multivariate meth-
ods bring additional information to bear on the decomposition of trend
and cycle, they can provide more accurate estimates of natural rates if the
underlying model is correctly specified. However, there is a great degree
of uncertainty about model misspecification, especially regarding the
proper modeling of low-frequency behavior, and as a result the theoreti-
cal benefits from multivariate methods may be illusory in practice.
We examine two versions each of two popular univariate filters, the
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter and the band-pass (BP) filter described by
Marianne Baxter and Robert King.31 For the HP filter we consider two
72 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2002
31. Hodrick and Prescott (1997); Baxter and King (1999).
1017-02 BPEA/Orphanides  12/30/02  14:54  Page 72alternative implementations, one with the smoothness parameter λ=
1,600, the value most commonly used in analyzing quarterly data, and
one with λ=25,600, which smooths the data more and is closer to the
approach advocated by Julio Rotemberg.32 Application of the BP ﬁlter
requires a choice of the range of frequencies identiﬁed as associated with
the business cycle, which are to be ﬁltered from the underlying series. We
examine two popular alternatives: an eight-year window, favored by
Baxter and King and by Lawrence Christiano and Terry Fitzgerald,33 and a
fifteen-year window employed by Staiger, Stock, and Watson to estimate
a “trend” for the unemployment rate.34 We apply these four univariate ﬁl-
ters to obtain both one-sided (real time) and two-sided (retrospective)
estimates of the natural rates of unemployment and interest.
We also obtain estimates of the natural rates based on two multivariate
unobserved-components models, and we offer comparisons with models
similar to those proposed by other authors. These models suppose that the
“true” processes for the natural rates of interest and unemployment can be
reasonably modeled as random walks:
For the natural rate of unemployment we implement a Kalman ﬁlter
model, similar to those used by Staiger, Stock, and Watson and Robert
Gordon,35 to estimate a time-varying NAIRU from an estimated Phillips
curve.36 (In what follows we treat the NAIRU and the natural rate of
unemployment as synonymous.) We also examine estimates following
the procedure detailed by Laurence Ball and Gregory Mankiw.37 These
authors posit a simple accelerationist Phillips curve relating the annual
change in inﬂation to the annual unemployment rate. They estimate the
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32. Rotemberg (1999).
33. Christiano and Fitzgerald (forthcoming).
34. Staiger, Stock, and Watson (2002).
35. Staiger, Stock, and Watson (1997a, 2002); Gordon (1998).
36. In the measurement equation, the inﬂation rate depends on lags of inﬂation (with
the coefﬁcients restricted to sum to 1), relative oil and nonoil import price inﬂation, and the
unemployment gap. We apply Stock and Watson’s (1998) median unbiased estimator for
the signal-to-noise ratio and estimate the remaining parameters by maximum likelihood
over the sample period 1969:1–2002:2.
37. Ball and Mankiw (2002).
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from this relationship.
For the natural rate of interest we apply the Kalman ﬁlter to an equa-
tion relating the unemployment gap and the real interest rate gap (the dif-
ference between the real federal funds rate and the natural rate of
interest). The basic speciﬁcation and methodology are close to those used
by Laubach and Williams,38 but we assume that the natural rate of interest
follows a random walk, whereas they allow for an explicit relationship
between the natural rate and the estimated trend growth rate of GDP. The
basic identifying assumption is that the unemployment gap converges to
zero if the real rate gap is zero. Thus, stable inﬂation in this model is con-
sistent with both the real interest rate and the unemployment rate equaling
their respective natural rates.39
As noted above, these multivariate approaches to estimating natural
rates are subject to speciﬁcation error, and therefore the resulting esti-
mates may be inefﬁcient or inconsistent. For example, the models used to
estimate the natural rate of unemployment impose the accelerationist
restriction that the sum of the coefﬁcients on lagged inﬂation in the inﬂa-
tion equation equal unity. But as Thomas Sargent demonstrated,40
reduced-form characterizations of the Phillips curve consistent with the
natural rate hypothesis do not necessarily imply this restriction, and impos-
ing it is invalid. A very different view, which likewise comes to the con-
clusion that these models are misspeciﬁed, is that of Franco Modigliani
and Lucas Papademos, who interpret the Phillips curve as a structural
relationship but, instead of imposing the natural rate hypothesis, propose
the concept of a “noninﬂationary rate of unemployment, or NIRU.”41 Fol-
lowing this approach, Brainard and Perry report estimates of the natural
rate of unemployment when the assumption of constant parameters and
the accelerationist restriction are relaxed.42
74 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2002
38. Laubach and Williams (forthcoming).
39. In two papers Bomﬁm uses other approaches to estimate the natural rate of interest.
Bomﬁm (2001) uses yields on inﬂation-indexed bonds to estimate investors’ view of the
natural rate of interest; unfortunately, because these securities have only existed in the
United States for a relatively short time, we have scant time-series evidence using this
approach. In earlier work Bomﬁm (1997) estimated a time-varying natural rate of interest
using the Federal Reserve Board’s MPS model.
40. Sargent (1971).
41. Modigliani and Papademos (1975, p. 145).
42. Brainard and Perry (2000).
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variation over time and across methods at given points in time. Table 1
reports estimates of the natural rate using the methods described above, as
well as the most recent NAIRU estimates by the Congressional Budget
Ofﬁce,43 the Kalman ﬁlter–based NAIRU estimates of Staiger, Stock, and
Watson and of Gordon,44 and Robert Shimer’s estimates based on demo-
graphic factors.45 All of these estimates are two-sided in the sense that
they use data over the whole sample period to arrive at an estimate for the
natural rate at any given past quarter. Figure 1 plots a representative set of
these estimates over 1969–2002; for comparison, the average rate of
unemployment over that period was nearly 6 percent.
The retrospective estimates share a common pattern: generally they are
relatively low at the end of the 1960s, rise during the late 1960s and 1970s,
and trend downward thereafter, reaching levels in the late 1990s similar to
Athanasios Orphanides and John C. Williams 75
43. Congressional Budget Ofﬁce (2001, 2002).
44. Staiger, Stock, and Watson (2002); Gordon (2002).
45. Shimer (1998).
Table 1. Retrospective Estimates of the Natural Rate of Unemployment, 
Selected Years, 1960–2000
Percent
Source or method 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Congressional Budget Ofﬁce (2002)a 5.5 5.9 6.2 5.9 5.2
Gordon (2002)a 5.6 6.3 6.3 6.2 5.0
Ball and Mankiw methodb 5.0 6.0 6.9 6.2 4.5
Staiger, Stock, and Watson (2002)a 5.8 4.7 7.7 6.3 4.5
Kalman ﬁlterb — 5.7 6.4 5.8 5.0
Brainard and Perry (2000)a 3.8 4.7 9.8 5.8 3.8c
Shimer (1998)a 5.3 6.5 7.1 5.9 5.9
Band-pass ﬁlter, 8-year windowd 6.0 4.2 7.3 5.9 4.9
Band-pass ﬁlter, 15-year windowe 5.6 4.4 7.9 6.3 5.0
Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter, λ = 1,600b 5.9 4.6 7.5 6.1 4.5
Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter, λ = 25,600b 5.3 5.0 7.4 6.4 4.6
Memoranda:
Median of estimates 5.6 5.0 7.3 6.1 4.9
Range of estimates 3.8–5.9 4.2–6.5 6.2–9.8 5.8–6.4 3.8–5.9
Actual unemployment rate 5.5 5.0 7.2 5.6 4.0
Sources: Literature cited and authors’ calculations.
a. Estimates are taken from the indicated source; Shimer estimates are from updates provided by Robert Shimer. 
b. Estimates are authors’ calculations; Ball and Mankiw results are based on a method described in Ball and Mankiw (2002).
c. Estimate is for 1998.
d. Following Baxter and King (1999) and Christiano and Fitzgerald (forthcoming).
e. Following Staiger, Stock, and Watson (2002).
1017-02 BPEA/Orphanides  12/30/02  14:54  Page 75those in the late 1960s. However, these estimates also exhibit substantial
dispersion at most points in time, indicating that, even in hindsight, pre-
cisely identifying the natural rate of unemployment is quite difﬁcult. For
example, the estimates for both 1970 and 1980 cover a 2-percentage-point
range.
As stressed above, the estimates of the natural rate of unemployment
that are relevant for setting policy are not those shown in table 1 and ﬁg-
ure 1, but rather the one-sided estimates that incorporate only information
available at the time. Figure 2 shows such estimates for a range of the
methods described above. In the case of the univariate ﬁlters, the reported
series are constructed from estimates of the trend at the last available
observation at each point in time. In the case of the multivariate ﬁlters, the
rate estimates are likewise based only on observed data, but the estimates
of the model parameters are from data for the full sample. Given the rela-
tive imprecision of many of the latter estimates, the true real-time esti-
mates in which all model parameters are estimated using only data
76 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2002
Figure 1. Retrospective Estimates of the Natural Rate of Unemployment, 1969–2002
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sided estimates reported here.
A striking feature of the real-time estimates obtained using the univari-
ate ﬁlters is how much more closely they track the actual data than do the
smooth, retrospective estimates reported in ﬁgure 1. This excess sensitiv-
ity of univariate ﬁlters to ﬁnal observations is a well-known problem.46
Evidently, these ﬁlters have difﬁculty distinguishing between cyclical and
secular ﬂuctuations in the underlying series until the subsequent evolution
of the data becomes known. This problem is less evident in the multivari-
ate ﬁlters, where the natural rate estimate is updated based on inﬂation
surprises as opposed to movements in the unemployment rate itself.
Figures 3 and 4 plot a set of two-sided and one-sided estimates, respec-
tively, of the natural rate of interest. Throughout this paper the real interest
Athanasios Orphanides and John C. Williams 77
46. See, for example, St. Amant and van Norden (1997), Christiano and Fitzgerald
(forthcoming), Orphanides and van Norden (2002), and van Norden (2002).
Figure 2. Real-Time Estimates of the Natural Rate of Unemployment, 1969–2002
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1017-02 BPEA/Orphanides  12/30/02  14:54  Page 77rate is constructed as the difference between the federal funds rate and the
ex post rate of inﬂation (based on the GDP price index). Each ﬁgure
shows two multivariate estimates (our Kalman ﬁlter estimate described
above as well as that from Laubach and Williams)47 and estimates from
the same univariate ﬁlters used to estimate the natural rate of unemploy-
ment. As in the case of the natural rate of unemployment, the various
techniques yield a broad range of possible retrospective and real-time
estimates of the natural rate of interest over time.
Given the wide dispersion in these natural rate estimates, especially the
more policy-relevant one-sided estimates, a natural question is whether
78 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2002
47. Laubach and Williams (forthcoming). They construct the real interest rate using the
inﬂation rate of personal consumption expenditure prices; we have adjusted their natural
rate estimates to place them on the basis of GDP price inﬂation.
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usefulness in predicting inﬂation and unemployment. To test the forecast-
ing performance of methods using the natural rate of unemployment, we
compare inﬂation forecast errors using a simple Phillips curve model in
which inﬂation depends on four lags of inﬂation, the lagged change in the
unemployment rate, and two lags of the unemployment gap based on the
various one-sided estimates of the natural rate of unemployment. We also
consider the performance of a simple fourth-order autoregressive, or
AR(4), inﬂation forecasting equation without any unemployment rate
terms. For this exercise we use the revised data current as of this writing.
As seen in the upper panel of table 2, the equations that include the unem-
ployment gap outperform (that is, have a lower forecast standard error
than) the AR(4) speciﬁcation, but inﬂation forecasting accuracy is virtu-
ally identical across the speciﬁcations that include the unemployment
Athanasios Orphanides and John C. Williams 79
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1017-02 BPEA/Orphanides  12/30/02  14:54  Page 79gap.48 To test the forecasting performance of methods using the natural
rate of interest, we apply the same basic procedure to a simple unemploy-
ment equation, where the unemployment rate depends on two lags of
itself and the lagged real interest rate gap. This yields the parallel result,
shown in the lower panel of the table. Evidently, one cannot easily dis-
criminate across speciﬁcations of the natural rates based on forecasting
performance. 
80 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2002
48. However, the suggested forecast improvement from including the unemployment
gap is based on within-sample performance. The usefulness of unemployment or output
gap estimates for out-of-sample forecasts of inﬂation is much less clear (Stock and Watson,
1999; Orphanides and van Norden, 2001). 
Table 2. Forecast Errors of Alternative Natural Rate–Based and 
Autoregressive Methods 
Standard error of the regressiona
1-quarter 4-quarter 8-quarter 
Method horizon horizon horizon
Forecasting inﬂationb
Constant natural rate of unemploymentc 1.11 1.12 1.74
Kalman ﬁlterd 1.10 1.14 1.80
Ball and Mankiw methode 1.14 1.11 1.73
Band-pass ﬁlter, 8-year window  1.10 1.13 1.78
Band-pass ﬁlter, 15-year window 1.11 1.16 1.74
Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter, λ = 1,600 1.13 1.13 1.79
Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter, λ = 25,600 1.14 1.16 1.80
AR(4) 1.18 1.24 1.92
Forecasting unemployment ratef
Constant natural rate of interestc 0.26 0.55 1.10
Kalman ﬁlterd 0.25 0.52 1.07
Laubach and Williams methodg 0.26 0.54 1.11
Band-pass, 8-year window 0.26 0.53 1.09
Band-pass, 15-year window 0.25 0.52 1.06
Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter, λ = 1,600 0.26 0.54 1.07
Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter, λ = 15,600 0.25 0.51 1.03
AR(2) 0.26 0.55 1.12
Source: Authors’ regressions as described below.
a. The sample period is 1970:1–2002:2. For the one-quarter horizon the forecast rate is that in the next quarter; for the four-
quarter horizon it is the average of the next four quarters; for the eight-quarter horizon it is the average of the subsequent four
quarters.
b. All except the AR(4) equation include four lags of inﬂation, one lag of the change in the unemployment rate, and two lags
of the unemployment gap.
c. For the constant natural rate case, no natural rate estimate is included.
d. Estimates are based on the bivariate systems described in the text.
e. Estimates are based on a method described in Ball and Mankiw (2002).
f. All except the AR(2) equation include two lags of the unemployment rate and one lag of the four-quarter moving average of
the real interest rate gap.
g. Estimates are based on a method described in Laubach and Williams (forthcoming).
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gauge the likely magnitude and persistence of natural rate misperceptions.
We start by computing natural rate misperceptions due solely to the limi-
tation that only observed data can be used in real time, assuming that the
correct model for the natural rate is known. Given the problems of sam-
pling and model uncertainty, we view these estimates as lower bounds on
the true uncertainty of natural rate estimates. The ﬁrst column of the
upper panel of table 3 reports the sample standard deviations of the differ-
ence between the two-sided and the one-sided estimates of the natural rate
of unemployment  for the various estimation methods. This
standard deviation ranges from about 0.5 to 0.8, with the Kalman ﬁlter
estimate lying in the center at 0.66. The lower panel of the table reports
the corresponding results for estimates of the natural rate of interest. The
standard deviations in this case range from 0.9 to 1.7, with the Kalman
ﬁlter estimate at 1.44. In our subsequent analysis we use the estimates
from our multivariate Kalman ﬁlter method as a baseline measure of the
uncertainty regarding real-time perceptions of the natural rates of interest
and unemployment in the historical data.
Natural rate misperceptions are highly persistent. This persistence can
be characterized by the following ﬁrst-order autoregressive processes:
where the errors νu,t and νr,t are assumed to be independent over time but
may be correlated with each other and with other shocks realized during
period t, including, importantly, the unobserved errors of the underlying
processes for the natural rates, ηu,t and ηr,t. Table 3 also presents least
squares estimates of ρ and σν for each of the various misperceptions mea-
sures. In all cases, misperceptions are highly persistent, with the Kalman
ﬁlter estimate lying in the middle of the range on this dimension also.
Note that this persistence does not necessarily imply any sort of inefﬁ-
ciency in the real-time estimates, but merely reﬂects the nature of ﬁltering
problems in general.
We now extend our analysis of the mismeasurement problem to
include model uncertainty. For this purpose we compare the one-sided
estimate using each method with each of the two-sided estimates. For our
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natural rates of unemployment and interest. Table 4 summarizes the
frequency distribution of the standard deviation and of the persistence
measure from these alternative estimates of misperceptions. Both the
standard deviations and the persistence measure of our baseline (Kalman)
estimates for both natural rates, from table 3, are close to the 25th per-
centile as shown in table 4. Table 4 indicates generally larger and much
more persistent misperceptions than those based on comparing the one-
and two-sided estimates from a single model; indeed, the magnitude of
misperceptions can be as much as twice that implied by the Kalman ﬁlter
model. Moreover, these calculations do not reﬂect sampling uncertainty.
In summary, combining the three forms of natural rate uncertainty sug-
gests that conventional estimates of misperceptions based on comparing
one-sided and two-sided estimates using a single estimation method are
overly optimistic about the magnitude and persistence of the problem
faced by policymakers.
82 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2002
Table 3. Misperceptions of the Natural Rates and Their Persistence Assuming the




real-time and Persistence Standard error
retrospective coefﬁcient of  regression
Method or source estimates (ρ)( σv)
Natural rate of unemployment
Kalman ﬁlter 0.66 0.95 0.21
Ball and Mankiw method 0.58 0.97 0.14
Band-pass ﬁlter, 8-year window 0.52 0.89 0.23
Band-pass ﬁlter, 15-year window  0.61 0.92 0.23
Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter, λ = 1,600 0.75 0.97 0.18
Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter, λ = 25,600  0.78 0.98 0.12
Natural rate of interest
Kalman ﬁlter 1.44 0.93 0.55
Laubach and Williams method 0.90 0.91 0.38
Band-pass ﬁlter, 8-year window 1.04 0.92 0.42
Band-pass ﬁlter, 15-year window  1.34 0.96 0.41
Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter, λ = 1,600  1.26 0.96 0.37
Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter, λ = 25,600  1.70 0.99 0.25
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. For each method the real-time misperception is deﬁned as the difference between the real-time and the retrospective esti-
mate of the natural rate. Estimates are those of the authors for this paper except where indicated otherwise. The sample period for
these statistics is 1969:1–1998:2.
Persistence measures
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We evaluate monetary policy rules using a simple rational expectations
model, the core of which consists of the following two equations:
Here we use u ˜ to denote the unemployment gap and r ˜a to denote the real
interest rate gap based on a one-year bill. The superscript e indicates the
expected value of the variable. This model combines forward-looking ele-
ments of the new synthesis model with intrinsic inﬂation and unemploy-
ment inertia.49 Given the uncertainty regarding the proper speciﬁcation of
inﬂation and unemployment dynamics, later in the paper we also consider
alternative speciﬁcations, including one with no intrinsic inﬂation and one
with adaptive expectations.
The Phillips curve in this model (equation 8) relates inflation (mea-
sured as the annualized percentage change in the GDP price index) 
during quarter t  to lagged inflation, expected future inflation, and
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49. On the new synthesis model see Goodfriend and King (1997), Rotemberg and
Woodford (1999), Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999), and McCallum and Nelson (1999);
models with intrinsic inﬂation and unemployment inertia include Fuhrer and Moore
(1995a), Batini and Haldane (1999), and Smets (2000).
Table 4. Misperceptions of the Natural Rates Allowing for Model Uncertainty
Frequency distribution based on alternative 
measures of natural rate misperceptionsa
25th 75th 
Statistic Minimum percentile Median percentile Maximum
Natural rate of unemployment
Standard deviation 0.48 0.63 0.75 1.04 1.34
Persistence coefﬁcient (ρ) 0.89 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.99
Natural rate of interest
Standard deviation 0.90 1.44 1.96 2.84 3.24
Persistence coefﬁcient (ρ) 0.91 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.99
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
a. The sample is the thirty-six alternative measures of natural rate misperceptions corresponding to all possible pairwise com-
binations of the six methods listed in each panel of table 3. Each of the two statistics is computed separately.
1017-02 BPEA/Orphanides  12/30/02  14:54  Page 83expectations of the unemployment gap during the quarter, using the ret-
rospective estimates of the natural rate discussed below. The estimated
parameter ϕπmeasures the importance of expected inflation in determin-
ing inflation. The unemployment equation (equation 9) relates the unem-
ployment gap during quarter t to the expected future unemployment gap,
two lags of the unemployment gap, and the lagged real interest rate gap.
Here two elements importantly reflect forward-looking behavior. The
first is the estimated parameter ϕu, which measures the importance of
expected unemployment, and the second is the duration of the real inter-
est rate, which serves as a summary of the influence of interest rates of
various maturities on economic activity. Because data on long-run infla-
tion expectations are lacking, we limit the duration of the real rate to one
year.
In estimating this model we are confronted with the difficulty that
expected inflation and unemployment are not directly observed. Instru-
mental variables and full-information maximum likelihood methods
impose the restriction that the behavior of monetary policy and the for-
mation of expectations must be constant over time, although neither
proposition appears tenable over the sample period that we consider
(1969–2002). Instead we follow the approach of John Roberts and Glenn
Rudebusch and use the median forecasts for inflation and unemployment
in the Survey of Professional Forecasters as proxies for expectations.50
We use the forecast from the previous quarter; that is, we assume expec-
tations are based on information available at time t – 1. To match the
inflation and unemployment data as well as possible with the forecasts,
we use first announced estimates of these series.51 Our primary sources
for these data are the Real-Time Dataset for Macroeconomists and the
Survey of Professional Forecasters, both currently maintained by the
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.52 Using the least squares method,
we obtain the following estimates over the sample 1969:1 to 2002:2 (this
choice of sample period reflects the availability of the Survey of Profes-
sional Forecasters data):
84 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2002
50. Roberts (1997, 2001); Rudebusch (2002).
51. Romer and Romer (2000) follow a similar procedure when comparing Federal
Reserve Board Green Book forecasts with the data.
52. Zarnowitz and Braun (1993); Croushore (1993); Croushore and Stark (2001).
1017-02 BPEA/Orphanides  12/30/02  14:54  Page 84Standard error of the regression (SER) = 1.38, Durbin-Watson statistic
(DW) = 2.09.
In these results the numbers in parentheses are the standard errors of the
corresponding regression coefﬁcients. The estimated unemployment equa-
tion also includes a constant term (not reported) that captures the average
premium of the one-year Treasury bill rate we use for estimation over the
average of the federal funds rate, which corresponds to the natural rate of
interest estimates we employ in the model. In the model simulations we
impose the expectations theory of the term structure whereby the one-year
rate equals the expected average of the federal funds rate over four quarters.
In addition to the equations for inﬂation and the unemployment rate,
we need to model the processes that generate both the true values of the
natural rates of unemployment and interest and policymakers’ real-time
estimates of these rates. For this purpose we use our Kalman ﬁlter esti-
mates as a baseline for the speciﬁcation of the natural rate processes.
Throughout the remainder of the paper, we assume that the true values for
the natural rates are given by the two-sided retrospective Kalman ﬁlter
estimates. Speciﬁcally, we append to the basic macroeconomic model our
equations 4 and 5 for u* and r*, respectively, and compute the equation
residuals—the “shocks” to the true natural rates—using the two-sided
Kalman ﬁlter estimates.
For the policymakers’ estimates of natural rates, we assume that the
difference between the true and the estimated values follows the AR(1)
process described by equations 6 and 7, with the AR(1) set equal to that
based on the regression using the difference between the one- and the
two-sided Kalman ﬁlter estimates reported in table 3. As seen in that
table, this speciﬁcation approximates several common ﬁltering methods.
The residuals from these equations represent the shocks to mismeasure-
ment under the assumption that the policymaker possesses the correctly
speciﬁed Kalman ﬁlter models.
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ural rate estimates result from a misspeciﬁed model, we allow for a range of
estimates of the magnitude of natural rate mismeasurement, indexed by s, in
our policy experiments. The case of s = 0 corresponds to the “best case”
benchmark (a standard assumption in the policy rule literature), in which
the policymaker is assumed to observe the true value of both natural rates in
real time. For this case we set the residuals of the two mismeasurement
equations to zero. The case of s = 1 corresponds to the assumption that the
policymaker possesses the correctly speciﬁed Kalman ﬁlter models (includ-
ing knowledge of all model parameters). In this case the residuals from the
mismeasurement equation are set to their historical values. As discussed
above, owing to the possibility of model misspeciﬁcation, this calculation
most likely yields a conservative ﬁgure for the magnitude of real-world nat-
ural rate misperceptions. To approximate the policymakers’ use of a mis-
speciﬁed model of natural rates, we examine simulations where we amplify
the magnitude of misperceptions by multiplying the residuals to the mis-
measurement equations by s. As indicated by the results in table 4, incorpo-
rating model misspeciﬁcation can yield differences between the one- and
the two-sided estimates that are on average twice as large as those implied
by comparing the one- and the two-sided Kalman ﬁlter estimates, implying
a value of s of up to 2.53 In addition, these calculations ignore sampling
uncertainty associated with estimated models; in consideration of this
source of uncertainty we also examine the case of s = 3.
For a given value of s, we estimate the variance-covariance matrix of
the six model equation innovations (corresponding to equations 4–7, 10,
and 11) using the historical equation residuals, where the misperception
residuals are multiplied by s, as described above. Note that, by estimating
the variance-covariance matrix in this way, we preserve the correlations
among shocks to inﬂation, the unemployment rate, changes in the natural
rate, and natural rate misperceptions present in the data. For example,
shocks to misperceptions of r* are positively correlated with shocks to the
86 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2002
53. For example, s = 2 approximately corresponds to the case of a policymaker who
may incorrectly rely on the HP ﬁlter (with λ=1,600) for real-time estimates of the natural
rates when the true process continues to be described by our two-sided Kalman ﬁlter. In
terms of the policy evaluations we report later on, we conﬁrmed that, using s = 2 with the
Kalman ﬁlter, errors are also very similar to those based on these misspeciﬁed errors. This
suggests that our approach of summarizing the magnitude of misperceptions by a single
parameter, s, captures the key implications of policymakers’ misspeciﬁcation of the natural
rate process.
1017-02 BPEA/Orphanides  12/30/02  14:54  Page 86unemployment rate and with misperceptions of u*, and shocks to misper-
ceptions of u* are negatively correlated with shocks to inﬂation.
For a given monetary policy rule of the form of equation 1, we solve
for the unique stable rational expectations solution, if one exists, using
Gary Anderson and George Moore’s implementation of the method
developed by Olivier Blanchard and Charles Kahn.54 Given the model
solution and the variance-covariance matrix of equation innovations, we
then numerically compute the unconditional moments of the model. This
method of computing unconditional moments is equivalent to, but com-
putationally more efﬁcient than, computing them from stochastic simula-
tions of extremely long length.55
Policy Rule Evaluation
We now examine how uncertainty regarding the natural rates of inter-
est and unemployment inﬂuences the design and performance of policy
rules. We assume that the policymaker is interested in minimizing the
loss, L, equal to the weighted sum of the unconditional squared deviations
of inﬂation from its target, those of the unemployment rate from its true
natural rate, and the change in the short-run interest rate:
As a benchmark for our analysis and for comparability with earlier policy
evaluation work, we consider preferences equivalent to placing equal
weights on the variability of inﬂation and the output gap. Assuming an
Okun’s Law coefﬁcient of 2, this weighting implies setting ω=0.2. We
include a relatively modest concern for interest rate stability, setting ψ=
0.05. Later we show that the main qualitative results are not sensitive to
changes in ω and ψ. In all our experiments we assume that the policy-
maker has a ﬁxed and known inﬂation target, π*.56
() (– )( – )( – )( ) .
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54. Anderson and Moore (1985); Blanchard and Kahn (1980). We abstract from the
complications arising from imperfections in the formation of expectations (Orphanides and
Williams, 2002). For simplicity, we also abstract from errors in within-quarter observations
of the rates of inﬂation and unemployment.
55. See Levin, Wieland, and Williams (1999) for a detailed discussion.
56. We assume that the inﬂation target is sufﬁciently above zero to minimize issues
related to the zero bound on interest rates and other nonlinearities associated with very low
1017-02 BPEA/Orphanides  12/30/02  14:54  Page 87We start our analysis of the effects of natural rate mismeasurement by
examining macroeconomic performance under the classic and revised
forms of the original Taylor rules:
The direct effects of natural rate mismeasurement on the setting of policy
are transparent under these rules: a 1-percentage-point error in  trans-
lates into a 1-percentage-point error in the interest rate, and a 1-percent-
age-point error in u* translates into a –1-percentage-point error in the
interest rate for the classic Taylor rule and a –2-percentage-point error for
the revised rule. The ﬁrst panel of table 5 reports the standard deviations
of the unemployment gap, the inﬂation rate, and the change in the federal
funds rate, as well as the associated loss under the classic Taylor rule in
our model, for values of s between 0 and 3. The next panel does the same
for the revised Taylor rule. Figure 5 illustrates some of these results
graphically, tracing out the unconditional standard deviations of inﬂation
(top panel) and the unemployment gap (bottom panel) for our model
economy when policy is based on the classic Taylor rule or the revised
Taylor rule for different values of s.
Starting with the case of no misperceptions, s = 0, we see that both the
classic and the revised Taylor rules are effective at stabilizing inﬂation
and the unemployment rate gap. The revised variant of the rule is more
responsive to the perceived degree of slack in labor markets and thereby
achieves lower variability of both inﬂation and the unemployment gap, at
the cost of modestly higher variability of the change in the interest rate.57
However, policy outcomes for both rules deteriorate markedly, and
increasingly so as the degree of misperception regarding the natural rates
increases. For example, under the classic Taylor rule the standard devia-
tion of inflation is 2.14 when s is assumed to be 0, but it increases to 3.67
under the assumption that s = 1, and 8.72 for s = 3. In addition, and of
greater interest from a policy design perspective, figure 5 illustrates that
ˆ* r
() ˆ .( – )– .( – ˆ )(
** * 1 4 05 20 fr uu tt t t tt =++ ππ π the revised rule).
() ˆ .( – )– .( – ˆ )(
** * 1 3 05 10 fr uu tt t t tt =++ ππ π the classic rule)
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inﬂation or deﬂation (Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry, 1996; Orphanides and Wieland, 1998;
Reifschneider and Williams, 2000).
57. This result is consistent with the ﬁndings reported in the studies collected in Taylor
(1999a) and elsewhere.
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Figure 5. Macroeconomic Performance of Taylor Rules for Given Degrees of 
Natural Rate Misperceptiona
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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1017-02 BPEA/Orphanides  12/30/02  14:54  Page 91the performance deterioration owing to natural rate uncertainty is worse
for the revised Taylor rule, because it places greater emphasis on the
unemployment gap. Indeed, for even modest levels of natural rate mis-
perceptions, the classic Taylor rule performs better than the revised
version, a result consistent with previous findings based on output gap
mismeasurement.58
We now examine the efﬁcient choices for the two parameters, θπ and
θu, that measure the responses to the inﬂation and unemployment gaps,
respectively, under a policy rule of the same functional form as the Taylor
rule with natural rate uncertainty. In this exercise we assume that the
policymaker is interested in identifying a simple, ﬁxed policy rule that
can provide guidance for minimizing the weighted variances in the loss
function (equation 12) with the weights described above. Figure 6 pre-
sents the optimal choices of the two parameters for various values of s.
As the left-hand panel shows, the optimal responsiveness to inﬂation
increases with uncertainty in this case. From the right-hand panel it is also
evident that the optimal response to the unemployment gap drops (in
absolute value) and approaches zero as the degree of mismeasurement
increases to values of s beyond 2. This ﬁnding conﬁrms the parallel result,
reported by various authors, of attenuated responses to the output gap as
an efﬁcient response to uncertainty regarding the measurement of the out-
put gap in level rules.59
This attenuation result contrasts with standard applications of the prin-
ciple of certainty equivalence whereby, under certain conditions, the
policymaker could compute the optional policy abstracting from uncer-
tainty and apply the resulting optimal rule by substituting into it, for the
unobserved values, estimates of the natural rates based on an optimal ﬁl-
ter.60 Rather, our result is similar to Brainard’s conservatism principle,61
where attenuation is shown to be optimal when policy effectiveness is
uncertain. 
Two key conditions that are necessary for the standard application of
certainty equivalence are violated in our analysis. First, we focus on
“simple” policy rules that respond to only a subset of the relevant state
92 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2002
58. Orphanides (2000b).
59. As reported by Orphanides (1998), Smets (2000), Rudebusch (2001, 2002), McCal-
lum (2001), Ehrmann and Smets (forthcoming), and others.
60. Swanson (2000) and Svensson and Woodford (forthcoming) offer recent expositions.
61. Brainard (1967).
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Figure 6. Optimal Policy Response Parameters under Taylor Rules for Given Degrees
of Natural Rate Misperceptiona
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. Optimal choices of the parameters θπ and θu in the policy rule given by equation 1 for different degrees of natural rate
misperception.
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fully optimal rules. The distinction is especially important in the pres-
ence of concern about model misspecification. As discussed by Andrew
Levin, Volker Wieland, and Williams,62 simple rules appear to be more
robust to general forms of model uncertainty than are rules optimized to
a specific model, indicating that, in the broader context of the types of
uncertainty that policymakers face, an exclusive focus on fully optimal
rules may be misguided. Second, and especially relevant for our analysis,
the traditional applications of certainty equivalence rely on the existence
of a model of natural rates that is presumed to be true and known with
certainty, which policymakers can apply to obtain “optimally” filtered
estimates of the natural rates. In light of the uncertainty about how to
best model and estimate the natural rate processes discussed earlier, we
find this assumption untenable.63
We now assess the implications of ignorance regarding the precise
degree of uncertainty about the natural rates that policymakers may face.
We start by examining the costs of basing policy decisions on rules that
are optimized with incorrect baseline estimates of this uncertainty. We
examine the performance of rules optimized for natural rate mismeasure-
ment of degree s = 0 and s = 1 when the true extent of mismeasurement
may be different. The economic outcomes associated with this experi-
ment are shown in ﬁgure 7 and the third panel of table 5, for true values of
s ranging from 0 to 3. As seen in the ﬁgure, the rule optimized on the
assumption of no misperceptions performs poorly even at the baseline
94 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2002
62. Levin, Wieland, and Williams (1999); see also Levin and Williams (2002).
63. To gain some insight into the breakdown of the traditional certainty equivalence
results in the presence of ﬁlter uncertainty, consider the simple static problem of minimiz-
ing the expected squared value of variable y = x – c, where x is a random variable and c is
the policy control. If x is observed, the solution is trivial: set c = x. Suppose instead, how-
ever, that x is not directly observable but instead must be inferred from the variable z =ξ x
+η . Let x and η be independently and normally distributed random variables with zero
mean and constant and known variances σx
2 and  respectively, and without loss of
generality let ξ=1. Then, if all these parameters are known, certainty equivalence applies
and the optimal control is  where  is the optimal ﬁlter applied
to z. Next, to illustrate ﬁlter uncertainty, suppose that instead of being ﬁxed and known, ση
and ξ are independently drawn with equal probabilities from  and {1 – sξ,
1 + sξ}, respectively. In this case, if we consider the optimal linear policy c =θ z, the opti-
mal choice of θ is given by  Note that θ=κfor sξ= sη = 0
but is strictly decreasing in both sξ and sη. Thus the optimal linear policy attenuates the
response relative to that implied assuming certain and known ση and ξ.
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1017-02 BPEA/Orphanides  12/30/02  14:54  Page 94value of s = 1, whereas the rule optimized assuming s = 1 is much more
robust to natural rate mismeasurement.
These experiments point to an asymmetry in the costs associated with
natural rate mismeasurement: the cost of underestimating the extent of
misperceptions signiﬁcantly exceeds the cost of overestimating it. Policy
rules optimized under the false presumption that misperceptions regard-
ing the natural rates are likely to be small are characterized by large
Athanasios Orphanides and John C. Williams 95
Figure 7. Performance with Optimized and Robust Taylor Rules for Given Degrees of
Natural Rate Misperceptiona
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. Asymptotic standard deviations of speciﬁed parameters for the Taylor rule given by equation 1 optimized for s = 0 and for
s = 1 and for the policy rule given by equation 3.
b. Logarithmic scale.
c. Loss is given by equation 12.
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1017-02 BPEA/Orphanides  12/30/02  14:54  Page 95responses to the unemployment gap. This can prove extremely costly. By
comparison, policies incorrectly based on the presumption that misper-
ceptions regarding the natural rates are likely to be large are more timid in
their response to the unemployment gap, but this is associated with little
inefﬁciency. In the case where there are in fact no misperceptions, the
policy optimized under the assumption of s = 1 delivers modestly worse
results than the policy optimized under the assumption of no mispercep-
tions; however, in the presence of even a modest degree of misperception,
the performance of the policy designed on the assumption of no misper-
ceptions deteriorates dramatically as the degree of mismeasurement
increases.
Given the potential difﬁculties associated with the optimized Taylor
rules in the presence of natural rate mismeasurement, it is of interest to
compare the performance of these rules with our alternative family of
“robust” difference rules of the form given by equation 3. In the present
context, this class of rules is robust to natural rate mismeasurement
because natural rate estimates do not enter into the implied policy setting
decision. The ﬁnal row of table 5 presents the efﬁcient choice of the
parameters θπ and θ∆u corresponding to this robust rule chosen to mini-
mize the same loss as the optimized Taylor rules. The stabilization perfor-
mance of this rule is also shown in ﬁgure 7. In this model this rule
performs about as well as the Taylor rules (equation 1) when the natural
rates are assumed to be known, and, consequently, it dominates these
rules in the presence of uncertainty, since with greater uncertainty about
misperceptions regarding the natural rates, the performance of the Taylor
rules deteriorates, whereas the performance of the robust rule remains
unchanged. The key reason that the robust difference rule performs so
well relative to the Taylor rules, even in the absence of natural rate uncer-
tainty, is that it incorporates a great deal of policy inertia. As noted above,
this is an important ingredient of successful policies in forward-looking
macroeconomic models when policymakers are concerned about interest
rate variability.
Given these results, we now consider a more ﬂexible form of policy
rule that combines level and ﬁrst-difference features. Figure 8 presents
the optimized parameters corresponding to the generalized policy rules
given in equation 2 for different values of s, which is assumed for this
experiment to be known by the policymaker. If the natural rates of interest
and unemployment are assumed to be known, then the efﬁcient policy
96 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2002
1017-02 BPEA/Orphanides  12/30/02  14:54  Page 96rule exhibits partial adjustment and a strong response to the unemploy-
ment gap, along with a response to inﬂation and the change in the unem-
ployment rate. We now examine how the optimal policy responses are
altered when the degree of mismeasurement is increased and this is
known by the policymaker. First, the response to the unemployment gap
diminishes sharply and approaches zero as the degree of uncertainty
increases. Second, compensating for the reduced response to the unem-
ployment gap, in the face of increased uncertainty the efﬁcient rules call
for larger responses to changes in the rate of unemployment. Third, the
Athanasios Orphanides and John C. Williams 97
Figure 8. Optimal Policy Response Parameters under Generalized Policy Rules for
Given Degrees of Natural Rate Misperceptiona
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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tainty rises, approaching the limiting value θf = 1. In the limit, as the
degree of uncertainty increases, the generalized rule collapses to the
robust difference rule.
The performance of optimized generalized rules is reported in fig-
ure 9, which repeats the experiments reported in figure 7 but uses opti-
mized generalized policy rules. As in the case of the Taylor rules, the
performance of the generalized rule optimized assuming no natural rate
misperceptions deteriorates dramatically if natural rates are in fact mis-
measured. In contrast, the rule optimized assuming s = 1 is quite robust
to natural rate mismeasurement. As noted, this rule features a great deal
of inertia and modest responses to estimates of u*. The performance of
the robust difference rule, as shown in figure 9, is invariant to the degree
of mismeasurement and exceeds that of the generalized rule optimized
assuming s = 1 for all values of s > 1.5.
The asymmetry in outcomes due to incorrect assessments, shown in
ﬁgure 9, suggests that, when policymakers do not possess a precise esti-
mate of the magnitude of misperceptions regarding the natural rates, it
may be advisable to act as if the uncertainty they face is greater than their
baseline estimates. We examine this issue in greater detail with an exam-
ple shown in ﬁgure 10. To facilitate comparisons, the ﬁgure plots pairs of
the policy responses, θu and θf, corresponding to different values of a
known degree of uncertainty (from ﬁgure 8). Note in particular the loca-
tion of the efﬁcient policies corresponding to s = 0, 1, and 2 and the limit-
ing case of difference rules (“Robust policy” in the ﬁgure).
Consider the following problem of Bayesian uncertainty regarding s.
Suppose that the policymaker has a diffuse prior with support [0,2]
regarding the likely value of s. By construction, the baseline estimate of
uncertainty is thus s = 1. As the ﬁgure shows, however, the efﬁcient
choice based on the optimization with the diffuse prior over s corresponds
to a choice of θu and θf that is closer to the certain efﬁcient choice with
s = 2, a worse outcome for this distribution. In this sense a policymaker
with a Bayesian prior over the likely degree of uncertainty he or she may
face about the natural rates should act as if conﬁdent that the degree of
uncertainty is greater than the baseline estimates. Of course, complete
ignorance regarding the distribution of s leads to the robust control solu-
tion, which here corresponds to the limiting case of the robust difference
rule (equation 3).
98 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2002
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model depends on the loss function parameters ω and ψ. As noted earlier,
in our analysis thus far we have set ω=0.2 and ψ=0.05, which can be
interpreted as a “balanced” preference for output and inﬂation stability
but one that exhibits relatively low concern for interest variability. For
comparison, in table 6 we present alternative robust rules corresponding
to different values of the loss function parameters: 0.1, 0.2, and 0.5 for ω
Athanasios Orphanides and John C. Williams 99
Figure 9. Performance with Robust and Generalized Taylor Rules for Given Degrees
of Natural Rate Misperceptiona
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. Asymptotic standard deviations of speciﬁed parameters for the generalized rule given by equation 2 optimized for s = 0 and
for s = 1 and for the policy rule given by equation 3.
b. Logarithmic scale.
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1017-02 BPEA/Orphanides  12/30/02  14:54  Page 99and 0.05, 0.5, and 5.0 for ψ. Given ψ, higher values for ω correspond to a
larger inﬂation response coefﬁcient, θπ, with a relatively small effect on
θ∆u. Given ω, a greater concern for interest rate smoothing reduces both
response coefﬁcients. This leads to a noticeable reduction in the standard
deviation of interest rate changes, but at the cost of greater variability in
both inﬂation and the unemployment gap.
Robustness in Alternative Models
Thus far our analysis has been conditioned on the assumption that the
baseline model of the economy that we estimated above offers a reason-
100 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2002
Figure 10. Efﬁcient Policy Response Parameters for Given Degrees of 
Natural Rate Misperception
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. Efﬁcient choice when policymakers have a uniform prior about s on the [0.2] range.
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including, importantly, the role of expectations. This assumption may be
critical for interpreting our policy evaluation analysis and finding that
the simple difference policy rule we identify offers a useful and robust
benchmark for policy analysis. Given that researchers and policymakers
may hold different views about the most appropriate model for charac-
terizing the role of expectations, and given the uncertainty associated
with any estimated model, it is of interest to examine whether the basic
insight regarding the robustness of difference rules in the face of
unknown natural rates holds in alternative models. To that end we also
examined two alternative models based on the same historical data as our
baseline model but reflecting quite different views regarding the role for
expectations: a new synthesis model in which economic outcomes
depend much more critically on expectations than in our baseline model,
and an accelerationist model in which the role of rational expectations is
largely assumed away.
A New Synthesis Model
In the new synthesis model we examine, no lagged terms of inﬂation or
unemployment appear as in equations 8 and 9, the short-term interest gap
enters the unemployment equation, and there is no lag in the information
structure regarding expectations (that is, time t expectations):
Athanasios Orphanides and John C. Williams 101
Table 6. Robust Policy Rule Parameters and Associated Performance under
Alternative Policymaker Preferencesa
Loss parameters
Rule parameterb  Standard deviation
ω, ψθ π θ∆u u – u* π∆ f
0.5, 0.05 0.57 –6.29 0.67 1.94 2.78
0.5, 0.50 0.25 –3.56 0.82 2.22 1.77
0.5, 5.00 0.13 –2.43 1.05 2.67 1.48
0.2, 0.05 0.35 –5.96 0.66 2.01 2.49
0.2, 0.50 0.17 –3.34 0.85 2.32 1.66
0.2, 5.00 0.12 –2.34 1.09 2.76 1.46
0.1, 0.05 0.24 –5.79 0.65 2.08 2.36
0.1, 0.50 0.14 –3.25 0.87 2.38 1.62
0.1, 5.00 0.11 –2.30 1.11 2.80 1.46
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. See table 5 for deﬁnitions of parameters and performance measures.
b. Parameters of the robust rule in equation 3 in the text.
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tics of the underlying data are the same as in our baseline model. As is
well known, this speciﬁcation does not capture the dynamic behavior of
the inﬂation and unemployment (or output gap) data very well when the
shocks to the inﬂation and unemployment equations, eπ and eu, are serially
uncorrelated.64 Following Rotemberg and Michael Woodford, Bennett
McCallum,65 and others, we therefore allowed the errors eπ and eu to be
serially correlated and estimated the model with this modiﬁcation using
the same data as in our baseline model, with the changes noted above.
Because our unrestricted least squares estimate of αu was essentially 0,
and therefore inconsistent with the theoretical foundations of this model,
we imposed a value for that parameter. We set αu = 0.05, following the
theoretically motivated calibration presented by McCallum based on a
model of the output gap.66 The resulting estimated form of this model is
Using these estimates and the associated covariance structure of the errors
in this model, we computed efﬁcient policy responses for the generalized
rule (equation 2) without and with uncertainty regarding the natural rates
as with our baseline model. An interesting feature of the new synthesis
model that differs from our baseline model is that, in the absence of
uncertainty about the natural rates, the efficient policies are superinertial,
that is, θf > 1.67 In the presence of uncertainty, of course, such policies
also introduce policy errors from misperceptions about the natural rate of
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64. Estrella and Fuhrer (forthcoming).
65. Rotemberg and Woodford (1999); McCallum (2001).
66. McCallum (2001); see Nelson and Nikolov (2002) for further discussion.
67. Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) explore this in detail.
1017-02 BPEA/Orphanides  12/30/02  14:54  Page 102interest similar to policies with θf < 1. The only difference is that the sign
of the error is reversed. Figure 11, which repeats for this model the
experiments shown in figure 8 for our baseline model, confirms that, in
the presence of greater uncertainty regarding the real-time estimates of
the natural rate, the efficient policy again converges toward θf j 1 and
θu j 0. Evidently, the difference rule in equation 3 represents the robust
policy for dealing with natural rate uncertainty in this model as well as in
the baseline model. This can also be confirmed in table 7, which com-
pares the values of the loss function corresponding to the robust rule
(equation 3) and the generalized rule (equation 2) optimized for s = 0.
From the second row of the table it is evident that the cost of adopting the
robust rule relative to the optimized one is modest when s = 0, and the
Athanasios Orphanides and John C. Williams 103
Figure 11. Optimal Policy Response Parameters under New Synthesis Model for
Given Degrees of Natural Rate Misperceptiona
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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1017-02 BPEA/Orphanides  12/30/02  14:54  Page 103benefits are considerable if the true level of uncertainty is s = 1 or higher.
This is similar to the result indicated earlier for our baseline model, as
shown in the first row of the table.
An Accelerationist Model
A key feature of the baseline and new synthesis models is the assump-
tion of rational expectations. As noted above, difference rules perform
reasonably well in those models even in the absence of natural rate mis-
perceptions. In “backward-looking” models with adaptive expectations,
however, difference rules generally perform poorly and may be destabi-
lizing because of the instrument instability problem. Moreover, in such
models the costs associated with responding to the change in the output
gap or the unemployment gap, as opposed to their levels, tend to be much
greater than in forward-looking models with rational expectations. To
explore this sensitivity of policy to a different speciﬁcation of expecta-
tions, we estimate a backward-looking model that imposes an accelera-
tionist Phillips curve and assumes that expectations are unimportant for
determining aggregate demand, with the exception of the real interest
rate, where we retain the ex ante real rate of interest from our baseline
model:
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(. ) (. ) (. ) (. )
– . ˜ – .(– )




19 0 477 0 099 0 255 0 123
0 089 0 094 0 093 0 088
0 278 1 189
0 096 0 323
13 6 19 6
1234
11 2
∆π π π π π
π
tt t t t




104 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2002
Table 7. Performance under Optimized and under Robust Rules for 
Alternative Economic Models
Loss when policy follows:a
Robust 
Generalized Taylor rule optimized for s = 0
Model ruleb True s = 0 True s = 1 True s = 2 True s = 3
Baseline 1.46 1.23 4.71 15.16 32.58
New synthesis 0.63 0.56 0.69 1.02 1.56
Accelerationist 5.13 2.19 2.53 3.54 5.24
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. Loss as calculated by equation 12 in the text.
b. Equation 3 in the text. 
1017-02 BPEA/Orphanides  12/30/02  14:54  Page 104Figure 12, which parallels ﬁgures 8 and 11 for our baseline and new syn-
thesis models, respectively, presents the simulated efﬁcient response
coefﬁcients of the generalized rule in equation 2 for this model. Two ﬁnd-
ings are apparent. As in the baseline and new synthesis models, uncer-
tainty regarding the natural rates raises the efﬁcient degree of inertia in
the policy rule and leads to a signiﬁcant attenuation of the policy response
to the unemployment gap. However, as uncertainty regarding the natural
rates increases, the efﬁcient policy for this model does not converge to the
robust difference rule (equation 3) as quickly as in the other two models.
Evidently, in a backward-looking world, there are costs from completely
ignoring the estimated levels of the unemployment gap and the natural
rate of interest, even when the uncertainty regarding natural rates is
signiﬁcant. The last row of table 7 conﬁrms this.68 However, even in this
model our experiments suggest that policies should exhibit signiﬁcant
smoothing and an attenuated response to the unemployment gap.
As the last row of table 7 also indicates, even in this case the robust
rule for this model performs better than the rule optimized under the
assumption of no misperceptions when the true degree of misperceptions
is as high as s = 3. However, this is a much higher threshold than that for
our baseline and new synthesis models.
Robustness to Both Model and Natural Rate Uncertainty
McCallum and Taylor argue that monetary policy should be designed
to perform across a wide range of reasonable models.69 In this section we
follow Levin, Wieland, and Williams and compute the optimized policy
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68. In backward-looking models this is a result that generally applies to price-level and
nominal income targeting rules, which, as noted earlier, are related to the robust rule we
examine here. For example, using a similar model (with some forward-looking behavior),
Rudebusch (2002) ﬁnds that optimized Taylor rules dominate some versions of nominal
income targeting rules even in the presence of mismeasurement of the natural rate of out-
put, whereas Orphanides and others (2000), using a more forward-looking model, ﬁnd that
rules targeting output growth are more robust in that case.
69. McCallum (1988); Taylor (1999b).
1017-02 BPEA/Orphanides  12/30/02  14:54  Page 105rule given priors over the three models discussed above.70 For this experi-
ment we assign equal weights to the three models and compute the opti-
mal choice of parameters for the robust policy rule. The results of this
exercise are reported in table 8, which follows a format similar to that of
table 6, which was based on the baseline model alone. The third and
fourth columns show the optimal rule parameters for the objective of min-
imizing the sum of the losses in the three models. The last three columns
show the corresponding losses. Comparison of the two tables reveals that
the optimal rule allowing for model uncertainty features slightly larger
responses to the change in the unemployment rate, but the response to the
inﬂation rate is from three to ﬁve times larger than in the baseline model.
106 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2002
70. Levin, Wieland, and Williams (forthcoming).
Figure 12. Optimal Policy Response Parameters under Accelerationist Model for
Given Degrees of Natural Rate Misperceptiona
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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that accounts for model uncertainty lie between those of the baseline and
accelerationist models.
Misperceptions and Historical Policy Outcomes
Our policy evaluation experiments highlight that overconﬁdence
regarding the policymaker’s ability to detect changes in the natural
rates—that is, the pursuit of policies that are believed optimal under the
false assumption that misperceptions regarding real-time assessments of
the natural rates are smaller than they actually are—can have potentially
disastrous consequences for economic stability. The sensitivity of eco-
nomic outcomes to policy design is potentially informative for under-
standing the historical performance of monetary policy, especially during
episodes when natural rates changed signiﬁcantly and real-time assess-
ments of these rates were likely to have been subject to substantial mis-
perceptions. As an illustration, we perform two experiments comparing
outcomes from the Taylor, optimized, and robust rules, designed to high-
light some elements we ﬁnd important for understanding the stagﬂation-
ary experience of the 1970s and the disinﬂationary boom of the 1990s.
Athanasios Orphanides and John C. Williams 107




Baseline New  synthesis Accelerationist
ω, ψθ π θ∆u model model model
0.5, 0.05 1.56 –7.13 2.89 1.12 5.45
0.5, 0.50 0.84 –4.23 5.84 2.20 10.19
0.5, 5.00 0.56 –3.21 24.21 9.61 32.06
0.2, 0.05 1.28 –7.85 1.88 0.74 5.27
0.2, 0.50 0.76 –4.41 4.60 1.84 9.73
0.2, 5.00 0.54 –3.26 22.55 9.32 30.72
0.1, 0.05 1.15 –8.19 1.53 0.60 5.14
0.1, 0.50 0.72 –4.49 4.17 1.72 9.51
0.1, 5.00 0.53 –3.28 21.98 9.23 30.22
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. See table 5 for deﬁnitions of parameters and performance measures.
b. Parameters of the robust rule (equation 3 in the text) chosen to minimize the expected loss for the indicated values of the
loss parameters, when the true model is unknown and each of the three models is assigned equal likelihood of being the true
model.
c. As calculated by equation 12 in the text.
Loss when true model is:c
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The stagﬂationary experience of the 1970s has proved a rich laboratory
for understanding potential pitfalls in policy design. A number of plausi-
ble explanations that boil down to inherently “bad” policy have already
been put forward for the dismal outcomes of that period: possible confu-
sion of real and nominal interest rates, unstable responsiveness of policy
to inﬂation, attempted exploitation of a Phillips curve that was misspeci-
ﬁed to include a stable long-run trade-off between inﬂation and unem-
ployment, and so forth. In our illustration we instead highlight the more
subtle complication arising from comparing policies that, as already
pointed out, would appear to be “good” under certain circumstances but
have different degrees of sensitivity to the presence of misperceptions
regarding the natural rates.
To set the stage, consider the evolution of perceptions regarding the
natural rates of interest and unemployment such as appear to have been an
integral part of the 1970s experience. (We review some direct evidence
from the historical record on the evolution of beliefs below.) To illustrate
the misperceptions that we wish to consider for this experiment, ﬁgure 13
traces an example that assumes that both natural rates increase over a
period of 2
1⁄2 years by 1.5 percentage points. We assume that, at the
beginning of the simulation, before the unexpected increases, policy-
makers know the correct levels of the natural rates. Despite starting with
correct estimates, their gradual learning of the evolution of the natural
rates when they unexpectedly rise results in temporary but nonetheless
persistent misperceptions. Given the average speed of learning implied
by our baseline estimates of historical misperceptions in our sample, the
1.5-percentage-point increase shown by the solid lines in figure 13
results in the real-time estimates shown by the dotted lines. For both nat-
ural rates, errors in real-time estimates—the difference between the true
natural rate and the real-time estimates—gradually increase at first, to
about 1 percentage point, and then dissipate slowly over a period of
many years.
The effects of these misperceptions on economic outcomes for the
classic and the revised Taylor rules are compared in ﬁgure 14. The upper
panel shows that, when policy follows the classic Taylor rule, natural rate
misperceptions lead to a persistent rise in inﬂation, which peaks at 3 per-
centage points above the policymaker’s objective. The bulk of this unfa-
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Figure 13. Misperception of Natural Rates Following an Unexpected Increasea
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 14. Performance under Taylor Rules Following a
Misperceived Natural Rate Increasea
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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vorable outcome is due to the strong response of this policy rule to an
incorrectly estimated unemployment gap, which can be seen in the lower
panel. As policymakers’ perceptions of the natural rate lag behind reality,
the policymaker incorrectly and strongly attempts to stabilize the rate of
unemployment at a level that is persistently too low. Throughout the sim-
ulation, the policymaker believes that the actual unemployment rate is
above the natural rate, and policy actions impede the movement of the
economy toward the true natural rate. The outcome is the modestly
stagﬂationary experience shown in the ﬁgure. The magnitude of the
increase in inﬂation is greater for the revised Taylor rule because this rule
is more responsive to the size of the perceived unemployment rate gap.
The magnitude of the peak inﬂationary effect depends on the parame-
ters of the policy rule, but as long as policy responds to natural rates, the
effects are quite persistent. The top two panels of ﬁgure 15 show the
responses from the generalized rule optimized under the assumption of no
misperceptions. The rise in the inﬂation rate is nearly 7 percentage points
at its peak, and even after seven years inﬂation is nearly 3 percentage
points above target. The robust policy likewise cannot avoid the initial
increase in inﬂation, as seen in the bottom two panels of the ﬁgure. How-
ever, because the robust policy is not guided by perceptions of the unem-
ployment gap, but only by the evolution of inﬂation and changes in
unemployment, policy does not impede the movement of the economy
toward the true natural rates in the way the optimized policy does. Conse-
quently, the increase in the natural rates leads to a much less persistent
deviation of inﬂation from its target in this case (bottom left-hand panel).
The relevance of this comparison for explaining the events of the
1970s rests on two elements. The ﬁrst is that misperceptions regarding the
natural rate of unemployment, and to a lesser degree the natural rate of
interest, signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced policy. The second and perhaps more
controversial element is that policymakers at the time actually operated in
a way resembling the Taylor rule or our “optimal” policy approach,
instead of a more robust policy.
Bearing on this are the fascinating intellectual debates regarding
“activist” countercyclical stabilization policies and the observation that
proponents of such policies appeared to have won the day at the turn of
the 1970s.71 The perceived triumph of activist policy is reﬂected in many
71. See Orphanides (2000a, 2000b) for a historical review.
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appeared to capture the hopes of both academic economists and policy-
makers across a wide spectrum of ideologies and backgrounds. One suc-
cinct accounting of the policy errors committed using this lens was
offered by Herbert Stein, who reﬂected on policymakers’ attempts to
112 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2002
72. Heller (1966); Okun (1970).
Figure 15. Performance under Optimized Generalized and Robust Rules 
Following a Misperceived Natural Rate Increasea
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. All changes are deviations from baseline values.









































Change in inflation (percentage points)
Robust rule
Optimized generalized ruleb
1017-02 BPEA/Orphanides  12/30/02  14:54  Page 112guide the economy to its “optimum feasible path”73 at the turn of the
1970s by targeting “‘the natural rate of unemployment’ which we thought
to be 4 percent.”74 In contrast, our baseline estimates, as well as those by
the Congressional Budget Ofﬁce, suggest that the natural rate of unem-
ployment at the beginning of the 1970s was nearly 6 percent. Stein’s
account is corroborated by a recent retrospective on Paul McCracken’s
service on the Council of Economic Advisers.75 The view from the Fed-
eral Reserve suggests a similar picture. Shortly after he left the Federal
Reserve, Arthur Burns, who had served as its chairman from 1970 to
1978, expressed his anguish over the deleterious effects of underestimat-
ing the natural rate of unemployment; like Stein, he noted that the initial
estimate of 4 percent proved, retrospectively, to have been too low.76 As
Orphanides documents,77 the related estimates of potential output and the
output gap during the early 1970s proved, retrospectively, to have been
exceedingly high.
Many issues complicated the measurement of the natural rate of unem-
ployment in the early 1970s, including disagreements regarding the mod-
eling of inﬂation dynamics and the Phillips curve, the meaning of “full
employment,” the proper accounting of demographics, the modeling of
expectations, and so forth. Starting with its ﬁrst volume in 1970, the ﬁrst
few years of the Brookings Papers are a valuable source documenting the
debate on and evolution of views regarding the natural rate of unemploy-
ment. Indeed, at the very first meeting of the Brookings Panel, Okun and
Nancy Teeters presented an analysis of the “full employment” surplus
assuming that the appropriate definition of full employment was the
4 percent rate of unemployment widely accepted during the previous
decade.78 Robert Hall identiﬁed the “equilibrium level of unemployment”
or “full employment unemployment” as the level that, “. . . if maintained
permanently, would produce a steady rate of inﬂation of 3 or 4 percent per
year” and noted that “[m]ost economists agree that this is somewhere
between 4 and 5 percent unemployment.”79 Perry presented estimates of
Athanasios Orphanides and John C. Williams 113
73. Stein (1984, p. 171).
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77. Orphanides (2000a, 2000b).
78. Okun and Teeters (1970).
79. Hall (1970, p. 370).
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demographic composition of the labor force (what later became known as
“Perry weighting”), and the dispersion of unemployment among age-sex
groups in the labor force.80 According to his estimates,81 whereas an unem-
ployment rate of about 4 percent had been consistent with a 3 percent
annual increase in the consumer price index during the mid-1950s, by
1970 the unemployment rate would have had to be around 5 percent to be
consistent with the same 3 percent rate of inﬂation. Finally, in one of the
earliest exercises of policy design based on an estimated econometric
model at the Federal Reserve (and, as far as we are aware, the earliest such
exercise using a model consistent with the natural rate hypothesis),
William Poole presented experiments using the Federal Reserve’s econo-
metric model with two versions of a Phillips curve: a “standard model”
(with a sloping “long-run” Phillips curve) and an “accelerationist
model.”82 Poole’s simulations using the standard model showed that inﬂa-
tion could be stabilized below 3 percent with a 4 percent rate of unem-
ployment. In simulations using the accelerationist model the implicit
“natural” rate of unemployment was 4.5 percent. Already in this work
from 1970 and 1971 it is clear that estimates of the natural rate were
beginning to rise from the 4 percent level that had prevailed during the
1960s. Nonetheless, the evidence is compelling that misperceptions
regarding the natural rate of unemployment remained sizable at the turn of
the 1970s.
Whereas such real-time estimates of the natural rate of unemployment
are well documented, real-time estimates of the natural rate of interest are
hard to come by. One source is the report prepared each year by the
trustees of the Social Security system; for several decades this report has
included projections of long-term interest rates. The forecast long-run real
interest rate reported by the trustees rose from 2
1⁄2 percent in 1972 to
3
1⁄4 percent in 1975. Before 1972 only nominal rates were projected, and
estimates of this rate rose by a full percentage point between 1969 and
1972. Given the relatively modest rise in inﬂation during that period, this
rise in nominal rates can be interpreted as a signiﬁcant increase in long-
run real rates. Overall, this evidence provides some support for a signiﬁ-
cant increase in the perceived natural rate of interest over this period.
114 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2002
80. Perry (1970).
81. Perry (1970, ﬁgure 2, p. 432).
82. Poole (1971).
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What Alan Blinder and Janet Yellen have called the “fabulous decade”
arguably constitutes, in some respects, the exact opposite of the dismal
experience of the 1970s.83 During the 1990s the natural rate of unemploy-
ment apparently drifted downward, and signiﬁcantly so. This lower level
of the natural rate of unemployment went hand in hand with somewhat
lower inﬂation; however, inﬂation remained more or less in line with
policymakers’ descriptions of their price stability objectives.
One possible difference from the experience of the 1970s is that natural
rate misperceptions may have been smaller and more persistent in the
more recent episode. Ball and Robert Tchaidze, for example, argue that
the Federal Reserve’s implicit NAIRU estimates may have fallen rapidly
in the second half of the 1990s.84 Even so, the record indicates the possi-
bility of signiﬁcant misperceptions. The transcripts of Federal Open Mar-
ket Committee meetings for 1994 and 1995, for example, show that some
members of the committee as well as Federal Reserve Board staff held the
view that the natural rate of unemployment was around 6 percent at the
time. By 2000 then-Governor Laurence Meyer was indicating that a range
of 5 to 5
1⁄4 percent was a better estimate.85 This points toward a nontrivial
misperception, perhaps as great as 1 percentage point, at the middle of the
decade.86 Table 9 suggests similar revisions in responses from the Survey
of Professional Forecasters as well as in estimates published by the Con-
gressional Budget Ofﬁce and the Council of Economic Advisers.
An alternative possibility is that, despite signiﬁcant misperceptions
regarding the natural rate of unemployment, economic outcomes were
better because monetary policy was more robust to such errors than the
policy framework in place during the 1970s. To highlight this possibility,
ﬁgure 16 presents two alternative illustrations for this period, tracing the
evolution of the economy following a reduction in the natural rate of
unemployment under our optimized and under our robust policies. Here
we assume that the natural rate of interest remains unchanged and that the
Athanasios Orphanides and John C. Williams 115
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as that shown in the right-hand panels of ﬁgure 13, but opposite sign.
Assuming the 1.5-percentage-point reduction in the natural rate of unem-
ployment underlying the simulation, policy under the optimized rule
would have led to deﬂation over this period, with inﬂation falling by
almost 6 percentage points during the simulation and staying well below
its initial value for many years. By contrast, our robust policy appears
more successful in replicating the “Goldilocks”-like economic outcomes
of this period.
Concluding Remarks
This paper has critically reexamined the usefulness of the natural rates
of interest and unemployment in the setting of monetary policy. Our
results suggest that underestimating the unreliability of real-time esti-
mates of the natural rates may lead to policies that are very costly in terms
of the stabilization performance of the economy. It is important to note
that our critique does not necessarily imply any disagreement with the
validity or usefulness of these concepts for understanding and describing
116 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2002
Table 9. Estimates of the Natural Rate of Unemployment, 1995–2002
Percent
Survey of  Congressional
Council of Professional Forecastersa Budget Ofﬁce
Economic
Year Low Median High Real-timeb Currentc Advisersd
1995 ——— 6.0 5.3 5.5–5.8
1996 5.00 5.65 6.00 5.8 5.2 5.7
1997 4.50 5.25 5.88 5.8 5.2 5.5
1998 4.50 5.30 5.80 5.8 5.2 5.4
1999 4.13 5.00 5.60 5.6 5.2 5.3
2000 4.00 4.50 5.00 5.2 5.2 5.2
2001 3.50 4.88 5.50 5.2 5.2 5.1
2002 3.80 5.10 5.50 5.2 5.2 4.9
Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia; Congressional Budget Ofﬁce, The Budget and Economic Outlook, various
years; Congressional Budget Ofﬁce (2002); Economic Report of the President, various years.
a. Responses are those from the third-quarter survey in the indicated year.
b. Estimates are from The Budget and Economic Outlook published in the indicated year (usually in January).
c. Estimates are from Congressional Budget Ofﬁce (2002).
d. Estimates are from the Economic Report of the President published in the indicated year (usually in February) and reﬂect
either explicit references to a NAIRU estimate or, when no explicit reference appears, the unemployment rate at the end of the
long-term economic forecast presented in the report.
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sions are based entirely on models in which deviations from natural rates
are the primary drivers of inﬂation and unemployment. Instead we argue
that uncertainty about natural rates in real time recommends against rely-
ing excessively on these intrinsically noisy indicators when making mon-
etary policy decisions. In that respect our critique echoes similar concerns
Athanasios Orphanides and John C. Williams 117
Figure 16. Performance under Optimized Generalized and Robust Rules 
Following a Misperceived Natural Rate Decreasea
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. Effects of a change in the natural rate of unemployment of the same magnitude and timing as that in figure 13, but of oppo-
site sign. The natural rate of interest is assumed to remain unchanged. All changes are deviations from baseline values.
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natural rates—concerns also reﬂected, at least in part, in more recent dis-
cussions of monetary policy.87
A key aspect of natural rate measurement is the profound uncertainty
regarding the degree of mismeasurement. Because the losses from under-
estimating measurement error exceed those from exaggerating it, Bayesian
and robust control strategies indicate that the policy rule should incorpo-
rate a biased protection against measurement error and respond only mod-
estly to estimates of the natural rates of interest and unemployment.
Indeed, in forward-looking models a “difference” policy rule in which the
change in the interest rate responds to the inﬂation rate and the change in
the unemployment rate, and not to the levels of the natural rates, performs
nearly as well as more complicated rules that incorporate both level and
difference features. Only in a backward-looking model do we ﬁnd a
strong argument for maintaining a nontrivial response to natural rates, but
even in this model the basic conclusion of our analysis holds: natural rate
uncertainty calls for very muted responses to both the natural rate of inter-
est and the natural rate of unemployment relative to policy rules designed
in the context of no measurement error.88
The historical experiences of the 1970s and the late 1990s provide
insights into the design of monetary policy in light of natural rate uncer-
tainty. In the earlier episode, arguably, policymakers mistakenly held to
the belief that the natural rate of unemployment was lower than we now
(with hindsight) believe it was, and they actively sought to stabilize
unemployment at that level. The result was rising inﬂation and eventually
stagﬂation. In the 1990s the reverse shock took place, but inﬂation
remained relatively stable.
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87. For example, Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan (2000) recently pointed out
that “However one views the operational relevance of a Phillips curve or the associated
NAIRU (the nonaccelerating inﬂation rate of unemployment)—and I am personally decid-
edly doubtful about it—there has to be a limit to how far the pool of available labor can be
drawn down without pressing wage levels beyond productivity. The existence or nonexis-
tence of an empirically identiﬁable NAIRU has no bearing on the existence of the venera-
ble law of supply and demand.”
88. Interestingly, Walsh (forthcoming) reaches similar conclusions in a recent paper
that assumes no measurement problem but in which policymakers cannot commit to a pol-
icy rule. He shows that in a forward-looking model it is optimal to assign an objective of
stabilizing inﬂation and the change in the output gap to a policymaker who acts with dis-
cretion, when the true social welfare objective is to stabilize inﬂation and the level of the
output gap.
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Discussion
Jonathan A. Parker: Athanasios Orphanides and John Williams have
written an ambitious paper that tackles a difﬁcult and important question:
how should a central bank conduct monetary policy in practice, that is,
not in a simple model of the economy, but in the complex and shifting
U.S. economy? The authors focus on two related problems that the Fed-
eral Reserve confronts continuously in its attempts to stabilize economic
growth.
First, there is a great deal of uncertainty at any point in time about the
true state of the economy, and actual policy can be based only on infor-
mation available at the time. A week before this conference, at the annual
symposium on monetary policy in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, Federal
Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan spoke about the difﬁculty the Federal
Reserve had encountered in guiding the economy through the boom of the
late 1990s: 
The struggle to understand developments in the economy and ﬁnancial markets
since the mid-1990s has been particularly challenging for monetary policy-
makers. We were confronted with forces that none of us had personally experi-
enced . . . . As events evolved, we recognized that, despite our suspicions, it
was very difﬁcult to deﬁnitively identify a bubble until after the fact.1
There is even now considerable uncertainty as to whether the increase
in asset prices of the late 1990s was a bubble, which tighter monetary
policy should have reined in, or an optimal response to changed eco-
nomic conditions, such as the possibility that the United States was in a
technological revolution that would increase the rate of growth of trend
119
1. Greenspan (2002).
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the economy, estimation error becomes policy error. Stabilization policy
becomes destabilizing.
The second main problem that confronts policymakers is uncertainty
about the response of the economy to the policies that they consider. In his
speech at Jackson Hole, Greenspan went on to argue that “it was far from
obvious that bubbles, even if identiﬁed early, could be preempted short of
the central bank inducing a substantial contraction in economic activity—
the very outcome we would be seeking to avoid.” Thus the Federal Open
Market Committee did not act to reduce equity prices in part because com-
mittee members were unsure whether those prices were or were not justi-
ﬁed by the fundamentals, and in part because they were unsure whether
they could reduce equity prices, or at least slow the increase in prices,
without slowing the economy so much as to cause a recession. Of course,
we now know that a recession was not avoided. Following the turnaround
in the stock market, a recession began in March 2001 and probably ended
late that year. This second source of uncertainty poses the following ques-
tion for policy: even supposing that the data during the 1990s had been
clear, would and should a more contractionary policy have smoothed out
some of the observed boom and recession? If one sets interest rates accord-
ing to policies that are optimal in a model that turns out to be a poor
approximation of the real world, model error becomes policy error. And
again, stabilization policy becomes destabilizing.
Given these problems, Orphanides and Williams recommend using a
policy rule that sets the federal funds rate, ft, as follows:
in which the parameters (the θ’s) on the inﬂation gap and the change in
the unemployment rate are chosen so as to allow for substantial move-
ment in the natural rate of interest and the natural rate of unemployment.
The authors base this recommendation on their ﬁnding that this rule per-
forms well in the sense of achieving close to the minimal attainable value
of the following loss function:
for a set of three simple models of the U.S. economy.
ωπ π ω ψ Var Var Var ( – )( – )( – )( )
**
tt t uu f ++ 1 ∆
ff u u tt t u tt =+ + –
*
– ( – )( – ), 11 θπ π θ π ∆
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not know the true state of the economy—because it does not depend on
real-time estimates of the natural rate of interest or the full-employment
level of unemployment. Rather, this rule depends only on economic vari-
ables that are observed easily and (almost) contemporaneously with their
occurrence. As an example of a widely used rule that performs well in
some small models, consider the following Taylor rule:
The rule proposed by Orphanides and Williams excludes the natural rate
of interest, rt
*, to which the Taylor rule responds, and replaces the natural
rate of unemployment, ut
*, with actual unemployment lagged one period,
to which the Taylor rule does not respond.
That the authors’ rule also deals with the second problem is less obvi-
ous. According to their simulations, much of the robustness of the rule
comes from the Federal Reserve acting more ignorant than it thinks it is,
in case it is wrong. In terms of its form, the rule has two important fea-
tures typical of optimal rules: a response to deviations of inﬂation from its
target, and inertia, that is, a response to conditions in the recent past. The
authors show that their rule does perform well in several somewhat differ-
ent small structural models of the U.S. economy. But all three models are
quite limited and quite similar, and I am unsure whether this robustness
would hold in a wider class of models.2
The balance of my comments address three points. First, I discuss the
reasons why the authors’ rule works well given uncertainty both about the
state of the economy and about the correct model of the economy. Sec-
ond, I ask why the authors (and others) focus on simple rules. Any rule
based on natural rates is not simple, and therefore the proposed rule is a
signiﬁcant step toward monetary policy simplicity. But simplicity is not
always a virtue, and the optimal rules, calculated given noise in real-time
estimates, might well perform better without much loss of robustness.
Finally, I argue (or rather, plead) that we should be able to do better at
fr uu tt t t u tt =++ +
** * ( – )( – ). πθ ππ θ π ∆
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2. I do not address the large question of what the correct model of nonneutrality is.
Readers should use their own beliefs to judge the reasonableness of the range of diversity
in the structures of the studied models.
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useful for policy.
Why does the authors’ rule work well, and why does it work well in
several models? The rule works well in the basic model speciﬁed in the
authors’ equations 8 and 9 because this structural model contains both
lags of unemployment and leads of expectations. The lags of unemploy-
ment imply that the current state of the economy is not simply described
by the current unemployment rate. Moreover, given that the objective
function penalizes volatility in the federal funds rate, and given the pres-
ence of variables representing the expected future state of the economy in
equations 8 and 9, the central bank would like to stabilize the economy by
having small movements in interest rates lead to signiﬁcant movements in
expectations. The central bank can achieve this by tying its future actions
to its past actions through lagged variables in its policy rule; this
approach, called policy inertia, has been studied by Michael Woodford.3
Thus the authors’ rule allows interest rate movements today to commit the
central bank to future behavior that cumulates to stabilize the economy
without short-term rates becoming highly volatile.
The proposed rule works well in the set of models examined because
the economic situation remains quite similar across these models. The
natural rates are potentially poorly known, and therefore any rules that
lean heavily on real-time estimates of the natural rates will do relatively
poorly. The loss function remains the same, so that rules that do not con-
tain inertia also do poorly. Finally, as I have mentioned, the models are
not that different from each other—all confer an advantage on the rule
that can inﬂuence expectations, and two of the three include substantial
lags in the propagation of economic activity.
Is the rule robust more generally? If these are robust features of the real
world, this rule ought to work well in many realistic models. On the one
hand, Andrew Levin, Volker Wieland, and Williams have studied a simi-
lar simple rule that depends on the lagged federal funds rate and not on
the natural rate of interest; they ﬁnd little welfare loss and some robust-
ness gain to such a rule over rules based on real-time estimates of natural
rates in a wider range of models of the U.S. economy.4 On the other hand,
any model economy has a natural loss function in terms of the welfare of
122 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2002
3. Woodford (1999).
4. Levin, Wieland, and Williams (1999). 
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across models using a loss function that does not reﬂect the differences in
welfare costs across models. I am also uncomfortable with the importance
of the interest rate smoothing objective in the loss function. Are there
really any substantial costs to highly volatile short-term rates above and
beyond the costs of deviations of inﬂation from the desired rate? On bal-
ance, given that one cannot test a rule under all of the inﬁnite set of possi-
ble models we economists might come up with, it is interesting and good
news that simple rules that do not require knowledge of natural rates per-
form quite well in a range of models.
My second main point involves the focus on simple policy rules. Given
that we are moving from a model economy, where simple rules follow
from simple models, to the real world, where actual policy confronts
potentially nonstationary environments, why use rules at all? A typical
response of economists is that commitment to a simple rule allows a cen-
tral bank to maintain a reputation and avoid the problem of time consis-
tency posed by the continual temptation to inflate. But the Federal
Reserve does not follow a simple rule. It has had and continues to have
complete leeway to deal with each new economic phenomenon as it sees
ﬁt. As I have noted, the Federal Reserve viewed itself as in largely
uncharted waters as it navigated the boom of the second half of the 1990s.
It seems to have solved the time consistency problem without a simple
rule, and with only independence. It has learned how to conduct policy in
a complex world; the behavior of Alan Greenspan and the Federal Open
Market Committee is not easily reduced to a simple formula that is opti-
mal in some model economy.
In this sense, then, I read the paper as advice for economists and as a
defense of the Federal Reserve, rather than as advice for the Federal
Reserve. Given that the Federal Reserve has learned a complex rule
based on large amounts of real-world, real-time data, would it ever make
the mistake of acting on a simple rule predicated on the incorrect belief
that it has accurate measures of the natural rates? It seems more likely
that the staff of the Federal Reserve, and academics more widely, might
mistakenly recommend or try policies that are optimal in simple models
based on data that are available only ex post. This paper also provides
advice for other governments and other economists setting up central
banks with legal rules that are optimal in simple model economies. A
good, robust simple rule should incorporate the central bank’s uncertainty
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variables.
Since I think simplicity has little value, I am interested in the analysis
of what rules are optimal in these models. Given uncertainty about the
current natural rates, the truly optimal policy probably is one based both
on the current estimates, with a reaction that reﬂects their signal-to-noise
ratio, and on a distributed lag of past estimates. Such a rule is, by con-
struction, robust to uncertainty about the state of the economy. It would
be nice to know how robust an optimal rule is across different models.
Although such a rule would be “complicated,” it would not actually be
more complicated than many proposed rules. As I have noted, and as this
paper makes clear, any rule that relies on natural rates is not simple. To
see this, write down the one-sided ﬁltering problems used in the paper to
construct real-time estimates of the natural rates and include them in the
speciﬁcation of the rule.
Citing the noisiness of estimates of the natural rates, the authors argue
for completely ignoring measures of the natural rates in conducting mon-
etary policy. It is here that I part ways with them and come to my third
main point. Consider the measures of the natural rates of interest and
unemployment plotted in the authors’ figures 1 through 4. The ex post
(retrospective) estimates differ significantly from the ex ante (real-time)
estimates, and there is little agreement among the series. But can’t we do
better? These series are constructed almost without regard to theory. We
should expect a smoothed series of the ex post real interest rate to do a
terrible job of matching the rate of interest in the economy that would
prevail if all prices were to adjust instantly and completely. One-sided
smoothed series will always overshoot turning points. The real-time
smoothed series are univariate, and so no information from forward-
looking variables is contained in them.
There are two ways to improve analysis in the future. First, use the same
model to evaluate the policy rule and to construct estimates of the natural
rates of interest and unemployment. Each model predicts structural relation-
ships among variables that should be useful in “forecasting” the natural
rates. Incorporating this structure would bring to the exercise consistency
between the natural rates and policy responses. If one employed several
models to estimate and study, this would deliver a range of estimates of the
natural rates, which would provide a measure of the degree of uncertainty in
the estimates at any given time. Any model would probably have to be made
124 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2002
1017-02 BPEA/Orphanides  12/30/02  14:54  Page 124more complicated than the authors’ equations 8 and 9 to be useful for esti-
mating movements in the natural rates, but the paper’s intent is to make pol-
icy recommendations for a complicated real world, and the Federal Reserve
surely implicitly uses some complicated model to judge natural rates.
A second and more feasible approach is to use an auxiliary model of the
real economy. To estimate the natural real rate of interest from a model
does require some heroic assumptions. But bringing a few Minnesotans to
a Brookings conference would not hurt. Certainly a lot of useful informa-
tion relevant to potential output—about tax rates, the capital stock, invest-
ment rates, and so on—is ignored in a simple smoothing exercise.
Understanding movements in the natural rate of unemployment seems
more straightforward. Robert Shimer has provided a model of the impact
of demographics on the natural rate of unemployment.5 The age structure
of the population should have a large impact, because younger workers
spend more time in unemployment as they switch jobs and careers search-
ing for a good match. The education distribution of the population, on the
other hand, should not affect the natural rate of unemployment, according
to several arguments. Given this, Shimer estimates the natural rate of
unemployment from the residuals in the following regression:
where ut
Prime is the rate of unemployment among males aged thirty-ﬁve to
sixty-four.
Figure 1 below shows the actual unemployment rate, two ex post esti-
mates of the natural rate of unemployment from the paper, and the quar-
terly averages of the monthly residuals from this regression added to 5.5.
I construct a real-time Shimer estimate using residuals calculated out of
sample from regressions ending in 1967, 1977, and 1987 as well as pre-
senting an ex post series.6 The ﬁgure shows that the real-time and the ret-
rospective estimates of the natural rate are not signiﬁcantly different.
Also, the estimates lie roughly between the Congressional Budget
Ofﬁce’s estimate and that of Douglas Staiger, James Stock, and Mark
Watson.7 Neither feature proves that the estimate of the ex ante rate is cor-
rect, but the estimate is both reasonable and stable. The estimates might
uu tt t =+ + αβ ε
Prime ,
Athanasios Orphanides and John C. Williams 125
5. Shimer (1998).
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changes in labor regulations and sectoral shifts.
To summarize, the proposed rule seems reasonably robust and close to
optimal in the class of models the authors examine. Policy recommenda-
tions should deﬁnitely account for the real-time lack of knowledge of the
true natural rates. I am interested in the robustness of rules that are opti-
mized given these shortcomings. But we should be able to construct better
estimates of natural rates, and these might be quite valuable for policy.
Janet L. Yellen: It is a great pleasure to discuss this paper on monetary
policy rules. I found the paper fascinating and provocative. It addresses
the central question facing monetary policy: how to adjust the policy
levers to optimize economic performance under uncertainty. Athanasios
Orphanides and John Williams follow the approach that is now standard:
they assume that the proper objective of policy is to minimize a loss func-
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Figure 1. Estimates of the Natural Rate of Unemployment, 1968–2002
Source: Authors’ calculations based on sources cited in the text.
a. SSW refers to Staiger, Stock, and Watson (1997a).
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from a target level and of output from potential, with a small weight
attached to interest rate ﬂuctuations. This objective function is a good
approximation of the goals of the Federal Reserve since the 1950s,
namely, price stability and maximum employment, as espoused in the
Federal Reserve Act. 
John Taylor’s paper of nearly a decade ago represents, in my view, an
important practical breakthrough in policy design.1 Taylor proposed a
very simple, intuitive policy feedback rule relating the tightness of mon-
etary policy—as measured by the deviation of the real federal funds rate
from a “neutral” level—to the gaps between actual and desired perfor-
mance of inflation and output. The rule has proved hard to beat: in sto-
chastic simulations it has produced good results in a wide array of
models. Better yet, it provides a remarkably succinct summary of the
“system” by which the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) during
the Greenspan era has successfully adjusted the monetary dials. 
As Christopher Sims explains in his paper in this volume, the FOMC
primarily relies not on rules of thumb but on judgmental forecasts,
detailed analysis of current conditions, and policymakers’ intuition. In
this context, especially given the possible pitfalls of judgmental forecast-
ing, I, along with at least one like-minded colleague on the committee,
Laurence Meyer, considered “rule-based policy recommendations” useful
additional input. Such recommendations might serve as a benchmark—a
starting point for FOMC deliberations. Of course, there could be good
reasons for policy to depart from a range of rule-based policy prescrip-
tions, but when doing so, the committee should articulate a sensible ratio-
nale. Since early 1995 the prescriptions of a number of variants of the
Taylor rule and related rules have been routinely provided to FOMC
members as part of a ﬁnancial indicators package. Committee members
differ in their degree of interest in this information. I should emphasize
that no Federal Reserve policymaker has ever endorsed the argument,
popular in the academic literature, that precommitment to a rule is needed
to overcome time inconsistency. 
Since 1995, perhaps spurred by the interest of policymakers, there has
been an explosion of research on policy rules. Orphanides and Williams
have made important contributions, and this paper builds on their previ-
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and it proposes an interesting alternative, which I will refer to as the
Orphanides-Williams (O-W) difference rule. I will try to summarize the
authors’ main ﬁndings, describe the advantages and possible disadvan-
tages of their proposed rule, and then speculate on the relevance of their
analysis to monetary policy in the United States during the 1990s.
The authors emphasize that implementation of Taylor-type rules
requires estimates of the time-varying natural rates of unemployment and
interest, about which policymakers are highly uncertain. The authors doc-
ument the extent of this uncertainty, using a variety of time-series tech-
niques to compare retrospective and real-time estimates of these two key
parameters. They demonstrate, convincingly in my view, that the mea-
surement errors are large and persistent. Uncertainty about the NAIRU,
and later about the equilibrium rate of interest, was unquestionably the
central issue for monetary policy during the 1990s. Although not all
FOMC members are enamored of the NAIRU model, an examination of
FOMC minutes and transcripts reveals ongoing, detailed discussions of
the magnitude, causes, and likely persistence of structural shifts in the
labor market that appeared to be responsible for an unexpectedly favor-
able combination of inﬂation and unemployment after 1994. The question
of what constitutes a “neutral” value of the real federal funds rate was also
critical to policy discussions at several junctures: in 1994–95, when the
Federal Reserve was raising rates to avoid unemployment falling below
the NAIRU; in the context of discussions of the appropriate response to
contractionary ﬁscal policy in 1995–96; and again in 1998–99 as aggre-
gate demand continued to outpace aggregate supply, suggesting that the
equilibrium real rate of interest had risen as a consequence of the produc-
tivity shock. 
The paper’s key contribution is its analysis of the implications of
uncertainty concerning the two natural rates for the design of policy rules
and stabilization performance. The authors use a small-scale rational
expectations model of the U.S. economy to compute the optimal coeffi-
cients and performance characteristics of rules designed to minimize
their loss function under alternative levels of uncertainty. They examine
Taylor-type rules, which allow policy feedbacks only from the levels of
unemployment and inflation to the federal funds rate, along with more
complex rules that also allow feedback from the lagged federal funds rate
128 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2002
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substantial inertial element, dominate the Taylor rule in the models stud-
ied in the paper; they also apparently come closer to characterizing the
Federal Reserve’s actual reaction function. 
The key result of the paper is that the losses due to overconfidence and
underconfidence about the levels of the natural rates are asymmetric.
When the true degree of uncertainty is high, policymakers who follow
the prescriptions of rules optimized to perform well under low uncer-
tainty are apt to incur large losses. In contrast, rules designed for condi-
tions of high uncertainty perform quite well when the true degree of
uncertainty is lower. It follows that policy rules that are optimal for a
high degree of uncertainty are robust, whereas those that ignore uncer-
tainty concerning the natural rates are fragile. Overconfidence produces
an especially large deterioration in performance with respect to the infla-
tion objective; the variance of unemployment around its target is less
sensitive to mismeasurement. 
Why do rules optimized for low levels of uncertainty perform so
poorly, particularly on the inﬂation front? The authors offer little intu-
ition, so I will hazard a guess. I suspect the main problem is that rules
relying on knowledge of the two natural rates tolerate persistent devia-
tions in inﬂation from its target. In the absence of shocks, an economy
with an accelerationist Phillips curve following the authors’ generalized
policy rule (their equation 2) converges to an equilibrium in which both
unemployment and the real interest rate are equal to the true natural rates,
and r*, but inﬂation will not converge to its target because of measure-
ment error. In equilibrium,
The persistent gap in inﬂation from target is larger the more the federal
funds rate responds to the unemployment gap (θu), the less it responds to
the inﬂation gap (θπ), and the smaller the degree of policy inertia (θf).
Small and persistent errors in estimating the natural rate of unemployment
can easily translate into large, persistent deviations of inﬂation from tar-
get under both rules. We can see this by substituting the coefﬁcients of the
Taylor rule optimized for s = 0 (third panel of the authors’ table 5) into the
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table 5) we obtain 
The inertial response of the federal funds rate under the optimized gener-
alized rule works to mitigate the impact of mismeasurement of the natural
rate of interest on the steady-state deviation of inﬂation from its target,
improving performance on the inﬂation front without a signiﬁcant deteri-
oration in the variability of output. 
This reasoning may explain why the authors ﬁnd, in their baseline
model, that increased uncertainty concerning the two natural rates should
cause policymakers to raise the weight placed on the lagged federal funds
rate, making policy yet more inertial, and lower the coefﬁcient on the
unemployment gap, attenuating the response of policy to what is recog-
nized to be a noisy signal of future inﬂation pressures. The authors ﬁnd
that optimal policy compensates for the reduced sensitivity of policy to
the output gap by raising the sensitivity of policy, θ∆u, to changes in
unemployment. In the limit, as uncertainty about the natural rates rises
(s → ∞), Orphanides and Williams ﬁnd that the optimal policy in their
baseline model converges to a pure difference rule, 
relating the change in the federal funds rate to the gap between inﬂation
and its target and the change in unemployment. They argue that this rule
is robust, performing well under conditions of both high and low param-
eter uncertainty. It obviously merits consideration for inclusion in the
Federal Reserve’s ﬁnancial indicators package. 
It would be useful if the authors offered some explanation for why their
difference rule works so well in the baseline model. One reason must be
that it avoids the possibility of a steady-state deviation of inﬂation from
target. The O-W rule insists that deviations of inﬂation from target be
eradicated through continuing adjustments in the real federal funds rate:
the rule produces a marked improvement in inﬂation performance without
a substantial decline in real outcomes. A policymaker following the rule
could not have tolerated the persistent, high inﬂation of the 1970s.
ff uu tt tt – .(– )– .(– ), –
*
– 11 03 5 59 6 =π π
ππ – .(– ˆ ). ( – ˆ).
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cations of interest rate inertia for the response of longer-term interest rates
to changes in the federal funds rate. In previous work,2 Williams and his
coauthors Andrew Levin and Volker Wieland found that, in forward-
looking models, the inclusion of a lagged interest rate in the policy rule
strengthens the transmission mechanism by enhancing the impact of
changes in the federal funds rate on longer-term rates and, in turn, on
aggregate demand. Assuming that market participants understand the
rule, they would expect any change in the federal funds rate to be persis-
tent, and these expectations would generate a larger response of the
longer-term interest rates that are more crucial to spending. 
However, before sending the FOMC on permanent vacation and rele-
gating the conduct of monetary policy to the Fed computer programmed
with the O-W difference rule, we need to consider the possible pitfalls and
alternatives. A ﬁrst question is whether rules of the O-W difference type
are robust across alternative models. Here the results presented in the
paper offer grounds for caution. Although a difference rule works well in
their fully forward-looking, new synthesis model, it performs poorly in
their backward-looking, accelerationist model. Even in the accelerationist
model, however, the authors’ ﬁnding that increased uncertainty should
push policy in the direction of an attenuated response to the output gap
and greater inertia in the interest rate survives. 
A second question is whether the performance of difference-type rules
is robust to perturbations of the coefﬁcients of the rule. I am fearful that
the operation of a difference rule with the “wrong” coefﬁcients could seri-
ously increase the volatility of real outcomes. Let me explain why, with
an example based on my own FOMC experience. 
I joined the committee in August 1994, when the Federal Reserve was
embarked upon a course of monetary tightening. Alan Blinder and I have
described the debate that took place during the fall and winter of
1994–95.3 It seemed to me that each time the FOMC convened, members
looked for evidence that the economy was slowing. The thinking was that,
until such evidence was in hand, they would just keep raising rates. This
type of reasoning mirrors the logic of the O-W difference rule: keep rais-
ing rates if inﬂation exceeds the target and unemployment is falling. Of
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intervals that is “just right,” but the FOMC was impatient for results and
could easily have gotten it wrong. By forgetting that monetary policy
works with long and variable lags, the committee might have engaged in
policy overkill that would have produced a hard landing. Luckily, signs of
a slowdown emerged by the time the federal funds rate reached 6 percent;
the tightening came to an end with the funds rate below the 8 percent or so
that the ﬁnancial markets were anticipating in December 1994, and below
the rate of over 6 percent embodied in the Green Book forecast. In this
context I considered the Taylor rule a helpful antidote to the committee’s
reasoning: unlike the difference rule, it suggested that, under prevailing
conditions, a federal funds rate around 6 percent would put the Federal
Reserve in the right ballpark. Since the O-W rule sanctions the very
thought process that alarmed me in 1994–95, I am concerned that reliance
on a difference rule with the wrong coefﬁcients could produce severe
instability in real outcomes and even instrument instability. I therefore
applaud the authors for their attempt to characterize rules that are robust
not only to natural rate uncertainty but also to model uncertainty. 
Before turning to the performance of the Federal Reserve during the
1990s, I would like to raise a few other questions concerning the use of
the O-W rule in monetary policy. The authors are not explicit about the
role they envision for their rule in the policy process. One question is
whether the forward-looking models studied in their paper assume that
the central bank must mechanically follow a rule in order to secure credi-
bility. If so, I wonder whether the rule is still useful as part of an FOMC
process that relies primarily on forecasts, judgments, and policymaker
intuition. 
I am also concerned that the alternative with which the authors com-
pare the performance properties of their rule is something of a straw man.
Under the alternative, policymakers sit on their hands even when inﬂation
persistently deviates from target. As the paper by Sims describes, how-
ever, the actual FOMC policy process, like that in inﬂation-targeting
countries, revolves around forecasts, not rules. Those forecasts are con-
stantly updated in response to forecast errors, an approach that involves,
among other things, constant reconsideration of the two natural rates. The
actual standard deviations of unemployment and inﬂation in U.S. data
over 1969–2000 do not greatly exceed the predicted values for their dif-
ference rule and are far smaller than the errors that would result from
132 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2002
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eral Reserve’s detective work in identifying structural shifts, analyzing
forecast errors, and estimating the size and persistence of shocks has
avoided (at least since the 1970s) the worst mistakes—persistent and
unintentional deviations of inﬂation from target—that overreliance on a
Taylor-type policy rule could produce. 
Finally, let me turn to the applicability of the authors’ paper to the con-
duct of monetary policy during the 1990s. The authors suggest that
policymakers may have done well during that period because they
avoided excessive reliance on natural rate estimates, which were chang-
ing. They suggest that their robust policy rule is successful in replicating
the “Goldilocks” economy. I ﬁnd this suggestion perplexing: the O-W
difference rule (assuming, following the authors, that “inﬂation more or
less remained in line with policymaker descriptions of their price stability
objectives” after 1994) would have called for raising the federal funds
rate from 1994 to 1999 in response to falling unemployment. In fact, the
O-W difference rule calibrated to the authors’ baseline model would have
raised the federal funds rate to double-digit levels by 1996! Of course,
such an assertion is a bit unfair, since the economy, and policy in turn,
would have responded, but such a simulation suggests that policy under
the O-W difference rule would have been tighter, producing worse real
outcomes and lower inﬂation than the Federal Reserve actually achieved. 
It is interesting to contrast the historical performance of the O-W dif-
ference rule with that of the original Taylor rule. If one assumes a con-
stant NAIRU of 5.5 percent and a constant equilibrium real interest rate of
2.5 percent,4 the Taylor rule ﬁts the Federal Reserve’s actual behavior
remarkably well after 1993, although policy was notably easier than the
rule predicts from mid-1998 until the end of the tightening campaign in
June 2000. The surprisingly good ﬁt of the Taylor rule until mid-1998
reﬂects the fact that unemployment and inﬂation fell in tandem, calling
for maintenance of a relatively constant federal funds rate. 
We should not jump to the conclusion, however, that the Federal
Reserve’s reaction to developments in the second half of the 1990s was
just a continuation of business as usual. Alan Blinder and I have argued
that the Federal Reserve did behave differently in response to economic
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falling unemployment. In our view the Federal Reserve was, in effect,
updating its views concerning the NAIRU throughout the period. Lau-
rence Ball and Robert Tchaidze compare actual Federal Reserve policy
with the predictions of a reaction function estimated with pre-1996 data
and conﬁrm that there was a shift in behavior in that period.5 Estimated
reaction functions ﬁnd that the Federal Reserve typically responds more
aggressively to changes in the unemployment rate than the Taylor rule
calls for. Ball and Tchaidze ﬁnd a growing gap between actual and pre-
dicted policy by the beginning of 1997. Their interpretation is that the
FOMC, along with outside forecasters, was lowering its estimate of the
NAIRU as the inﬂuence of supply shocks, particularly the productivity
shock, became more evident and the linkages between faster productivity
growth and the NAIRU became more obvious. They show that when the
declining NAIRU estimates of forecasters are substituted into the pre-
1996 reaction function, Fed behavior looks quite normal. As the authors
recognize, “natural rate updating” is an alternative interpretation of mon-
etary policy in the 1990s. 
Laurence Meyer, who served on the FOMC throughout the period,
offers yet a different interpretation of Federal Reserve strategy during the
1990s. Meyer and his coauthors Eric Swanson and Volker Wieland argue
that the appropriate tactic for dealing with increased uncertainty about the
NAIRU is to respond less to changes in unemployment and more to
changes in inﬂation.6 (Since the unemployment gap is a predictor of the
change in inﬂation, a response of policy to unemployment could be con-
sidered preemptive, whereas a response to inﬂation is reactive.) In their
view Federal Reserve policy simply became less preemptive in the face of
growing uncertainty about the NAIRU. Meyer also shows that a strong,
“nonlinear” response to unemployment is warranted when the unemploy-
ment rate falls below the lower threshold of the range of NAIRU uncer-
tainty. According to this logic, the Federal Reserve began responding
preemptively to falling unemployment when such a threshold was crossed
in mid-1999. 
134 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2002
5. Ball and Tchaidze (2002).
6. Meyer, Swanson, and Wieland (2001).
1017-02 BPEA/Orphanides  12/30/02  14:54  Page 134Let me conclude by saying that this paper makes a valuable and con-
structive contribution to a burgeoning ﬁeld of research that is generating
important payoffs for the practice of monetary policy. 
General discussion: Panelists represented the full range of views about
the value of rules in the conduct of monetary policy. Gregory Mankiw
observed that the rule suggested by Orphanides and Williams would have
called for a monetary tightening in the 1990s. Although this would have
been difﬁcult to defend at that time, in hindsight it might have been opti-
mal to tighten monetary policy at some point between 1997 and 1999.
Robert Gordon underlined Janet Yellen’s remark that the Taylor rule
describes the policy of the Federal Reserve during the 1990s remarkably
well except for 1998, the heyday of positive supply shocks to the U.S.
economy. Nevertheless, Gordon agreed with Mankiw in suggesting that
tightening in 1998 might have dampened the volatility the economy has
experienced in 2001 and 2002. Alice Rivlin disagreed with Mankiw and
Gordon. She argued that 1998 was a special year because of the Russian
crisis and the fragility of global ﬁnancial markets generally. In that situa-
tion the Federal Reserve appropriately placed unusual weight on the
world economy’s need for loosening, which the domestic economy did
not need. Rivlin also observed that, during her tenure on the Federal Open
Market Committee from 1996 to 1999, many members believed that the
natural rate of unemployment—if there was such a thing—was falling.
Productivity growth was accelerating, unemployment was going down,
yet the inﬂation rate was still falling. It was not clear that there was an
“unemployment gap,” and so the FOMC did not raise rates until mid-
1999. Rivlin believed this was likely to have been the best policy. She
went on to stress the importance, when analyzing Federal Reserve behav-
ior, of recognizing that the FOMC is, after all, a committee. It is mislead-
ing to talk about Federal Reserve policy as if it were based on unanimous
agreement about goals and perceptions. FOMC members often have very
different perceptions of the economic situation, different targets, and dif-
ferent ways of thinking about the economy. 
Richard Cooper questioned the wisdom of conducting monetary policy
on the basis of rules. He was skeptical of the common argument that a rule
enhances credibility. In his view a simple or even a complex rule that is
followed mechanically does not enhance credibility, but to the contrary
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of rules is that they indirectly communicate the goals of policy; Cooper
thought it preferable to discuss policy objectives explicitly. Even complex
rules are unlikely to anticipate and deal appropriately with unusual
events. For example, he agreed with Rivlin that the threat to the global
ﬁnancial system in 1998 warranted the strong reaction of the Federal
Reserve. Cooper drew an analogy to ﬂying an airplane. Under ordinary
conditions an airplane can ﬂy on autopilot, responding to accurate and
timely information according to very sophisticated rules, yet every com-
mercial jetliner in the skies today is still equipped with two pilots. In
Cooper’s view one can depend on rules alone only if they are extremely
complicated, and even then only with a lot of real-time input. Although it
may someday be possible to turn all of the ﬂying over to an autopilot,
managing the economy is much more complicated than ﬂying a plane.
Mankiw responded that the phrase “following a rule” admits of two dif-
ferent interpretations. In Cooper’s interpretation a rule is something that,
once written down, is always strictly executed. In the alternative interpre-
tation rules are no more than a guide or reference point for policy, with
policymakers retaining discretion. If, Mankiw argued, one believes that
models are useful for guiding policy, and that models are forward look-
ing, then policy advice is naturally formulated as a rule. 
The difference between the actual and the natural rate of unemploy-
ment, and uncertainty about that gap, play central roles in Orphanides and
Williams’s proposed rule. Edmund Phelps said he believed that the nat-
ural rate of unemployment is subject to marked cyclical swings, and that
swings in the actual unemployment rate primarily reﬂect such swings in
the natural rate. As a consequence, the central bank should not focus on
the unemployment rate or on a putative unemployment gap in setting pol-
icy. Rivlin and Christopher Sims also expressed doubts about the useful-
ness of the natural rate concept. Rivlin observed that the natural rate was
always known to be both unobservable and variable, but was nevertheless
thought to be useful to policymakers. The signiﬁcance of the paper was
that it cast doubt on the usefulness of the natural rate for policymaking. If
a parameter was unobservable and variable and led to worse policy out-
comes, one might wonder if it was useful at all. Sims observed that the
determinants of inﬂation are multivariate, and that the relative importance
of each causal factor differs from period to period. He thought that the nat-
ural rate concept remained popular for two reasons. First, it has the attrac-
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bivariate relationship. Second, it reﬂects a tendency of policymakers to
rely too heavily on theoretical work and neglect some important empirical
results. For example, policymakers in the 1970s relied on contemporary
theories favoring a downward-sloping Phillips curve, even though many
empirical studies indicated that the Phillips curve was vertical. 
Phelps thought the advice he had offered for policymakers in his 1971
book, Inﬂation Policy and Unemployment Theory, remained relevant. If
public expectations of the inﬂation rate exceed the equilibrium inﬂation
rate, the Federal Reserve should tighten monetary policy in order to dis-
appoint those expectations. Phelps did not think it necessary for the cen-
tral bank to know the precise natural rate in order to conduct sensible
policy, and in any case he thought Orphanides and Williams overstated
the uncertainty about it. He noted that a battalion of economists over the
last twelve to ﬁfteen years had tried to estimate the relationship between
the natural rate and various features of the economy, such as demographic
structure, technological progress, and the real rate of interest. Phelps
believed that we do know quite a bit about the natural rate and the causes
of its shifts, and he agreed with Jonathan Parker that we should make bet-
ter use of this knowledge. William Brainard, noting that changes in the
economy’s structure would show up as autocorrelation in the natural rate,
was skeptical of Orphanides and Williams’s assumption that the natural
rate follows a random walk. Willem Buiter agreed and went on to suggest
it was likely that the actual and the natural rate are cointegrated. 
Several panelists commented on the details of model speciﬁcation and
of the statistical tests used by Orphanides and Williams. Mankiw observed
that, with only slight modiﬁcation, the authors’ rule would become a rule
in which the federal funds rate depends on the deviation of the unemploy-
ment rate from some moving average of past unemployment rates. If this
moving average is taken as a rough estimate of the natural rate of unem-
ployment, their rule is actually quite similar to a Taylor rule. Benjamin
Friedman noted that the performance of Taylor rules varies considerably
with the lag structure used. This led him to wonder how sensitive the per-
formance of the difference rule suggested by Orphanides and Williams
might be to the lags used in calculating changes in the unemployment
rate—for example, whether the lag was one quarter or one year. Gordon
noted that the authors did not consider supply shocks. Because of supply
shocks, it makes a difference whether the central bank targets headline
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Federal Reserve. Whether the response of monetary policy to an oil price
shock should mimic the response to a change in the unemployment gap
depends on many factors not discussed in the paper, for example whether
wages respond differently to core than to headline inﬂation, and the feed-
back of the oil price shocks to core inﬂation itself. 
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